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The paper embodies an evaluation of the fishery policy at EU level. The com-
mon fishery policy is designed to solve a complex set of problems that emerge 
in the sector. This embodies on the one hand that the fishery policy is directed 
towards objectives that have their offspring in different theoretical paradigms 
for conservation, rationalisation and the community. On the other hand, the 
common fishery policy is also accommodates to solve the conflicting interests 
of the Member States; for example the resource sharing. The analysis in the pa-
per shows that the Common Fishery Policy is based on inconsistent objectives, 
which arise as a consequence of the attempt to formulate a policy that deals 
with mutually conflicting objectives at the same time.  
 
The paper takes its outline in describing elements in the historical process of the 
development of the common fisheries policy. It is found that the issue of equal 
or restricted access to the fish resource has had an important influence on the 
formulating of the historical policies as it is also has today. In the analysis of 
the current fishery policy the paper primarily places its focus on the elements of 
the policies for conservation, structure and control, their objectives and means. 
It is indicated that the implemented policies do not state solution that entirely 
prevents the distortions of overfishery and overcapitalisation present in the clas-
sical open access fishery. This is e.g. seen in the structural policy, where the 
Member States are not prevented from acting strategically in order to pursue 
their own interests. Moreover, the control policy shows that the EU has had dif-
ficulties in implementing a reliable policy, which would prevent the Member 
States from using the control policy in their own favour by implementing a lais-
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1.  Introduction 
The overfishing and overcapitalisation in the fishing fleet are classical distor-
tions, which can be discovered in the open access fishery that is characterised 
by free entry and absence of well-defined property rights. The fishery economic 
literature is full of examples that give normative solutions to the distortions in 
the open access fishery (Warming, 1991; Gordon, 1954; McKelvey, 1985). The 
aim in the following is merely positivistic as it emphasises the institutional and 
regulatory arrangements, which are implemented in the EU. More specifically, 
the implemented policy’s ability to reduce rivalry over fishing resources b e-
tween the EU
2 Member States is addressed. In this sense the Common Fishery 
Policy is analysed from an inter-state perspective, and the implemented policy 
is seen as a result of different national interests as expressed in the negotiations 
of the Common Fishery Policy. The result of these negotiations is outlined in a 
fishing regime, which is presented in the Common Fishery Policy, which em-
ploys state property in a form that allows fishermen of all Member States equal 
access to the Member States’ fishing waters
3. In addition, regulation of the fish-
ery is accomplished e.g. through the policies for conservation, structure and 
control at the EU level. The Member States play an important role in the man-
agement of the fishery policy, and they have competence to impose national 
policy that is compatible with the intention of the EU. 
 
In the general perspective, the EU has implemented a range of institutional and 
legal arrangements, which reduce the classical distortions of the open access 
fishery. But although the EU de jure is a regulated state property
4, which im-
plies the use of means to counteract the distortions, the present analysis shows 
that the fishing policy does not entirely hinder distortions in the fishery, accord-
ing to Feeny et al. (1996). The premise in the present analysis is that the Mem-
ber States’ incentives for individual economic maximisation and the r ivalry 
                                                                 
 2.  In the following only EU will be applied to designate the European Union. 
 3.  Formally, the fishing grounds of the Member States property, but in the EU the state property 
of extended version means that fishermen from all Member States have equal access. 
 4.  Use and access rights are impacted by regulations of the EU and the Member States.  
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over the resources did not vanish when the Common Fishery Policy was estab-
lished. The qualitative analysis presented in the following chapters shows sev-
eral examples of shortcomings in the applied policy of the conservation, struc-
ture and control policy, which leads to market failures in the EU fishery.  
 
In the present analysis of the Common Fishery Policy  focus is placed on the 
implemented fishery policy in the EU. Moreover, it is addressed to which extent 
distortions and rivalry over the resources are solved by the implemented policy. 
Finally, by assuming the implemented fishing regime as a benchmark, recom-
mendations are given for fine-tuning the policy to reduce the distortions within 
the feasible regime. 
 
The qualitative analysis begins in section 1.1. with a brief description of the 
classic theory of the market failures of over-depletion of the resource and over-
capitalisation in the common pool fisheries, and different paradigms for con-
trolling the fisheries are considered. In chapter 2 a historical review of the de-
velopment of fishery policy is summarised with the purpose to describe the 
Member States’ inherent resource conflicts, which are emphasised in the form-
ing of the Common Fishery Policy. Detailed descriptions and evaluations of the 
current Common Fishery Policies for conservation, structure, and control fol-
lows in chapter 3. These policies are seen to have particular importance in in-
fluencing the market failures in the EU fishery. The evaluation of the policies 
contains the outlining of the main shortcomings of the implemented policies 
and recommendations to change them. Finally, the conclusion contains a sum-
mary of the main shortcomings of the EU Fishery Policy. 
1.1.  Markets Failures in International Fisheries 
The exploitation of the fishing resources is one of the areas where international 
co-operation is an advantage, the reason being that the fish resources in general 
are not limited within certain borders. This means that competition will be es-
tablished between fishermen in different countries in order to harvest from the 
available fish stocks. Theoretically, the fishing resource is defined as a common  
9
pool resource
5 that is characterised by two conditions. First, no one has the pro-
prietary right
6 to the fishing resource; i.e. no one is prevented from exploiting 
the resource, called non-exclusiveness. The other condition rival consumption, 
i.e. one party’s consumption of the good, reduces the quantity left for the others 
(Grafton, Squires and Kirkley, 1996). 
 
The general result in the fishery literature is that leaving the fishery “of n o-
body’s property” to the forces of the competitive markets without implementing 
any kind of regulation will not be optimal from society’s point of view. This is 
seen in the fishery under the open access regime, where there is no property, no 
regulation on the number of fishing vessels participating, and there are no re-
strictions on the catches. Society’s loss under the open access fishery is moni-
tored by declining catches, decreasing incomes for fishermen, and overcapitali-
sation by the use of too many vessels and too much gear, and excessive labour 
input in the fishery (cf. Libecap, 1990). The reason for society’s loss under the 
open access is that there is a difference between the realised equilibrium based 
on private decision making, and the optimal social equilibrium based on the so-
cial costs and benefits (cf. Gordon, 1954). Under the open access fishery the 
fishermen are assumed to act rationally at the individual level by maximising 
their own income. This has the implication that the equilibrium in the fishery 
will be settled at a point where the relevant private marginal cost of access and 
production is equal to the private marginal return. It is assumed that the indi-
vidual fisherman does not include the external costs that exist because his pro-
duction reduces the productivity of others, who use the open access resource. 
The consequence of the individual decision-maker’s ignorance of the external 
costs is that the equilibrium is located at a point with overcapitalisation and 
overexploitation of the resources compared with the social optimal production 
(Munro and Scott, 1985). Moreover, under the open access fishery, the fisher-
man has no incentives to postpone or reduce the utilisation of the resource, be-
cause the other users act individually maximising. This has the consequence 
that any fisherman reducing his utilisation will have an income that is lower 
                                                                 
 5.  The ‘common pool resource’ concept follows the definitions by Ostrom (1986).  
 6.  The no property concept is not the same as common property. The latter concept it is assumed 
to be the property of a group of co-owners cf. Bromley (1991).  
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than the average income. In this sense the individual can not collect the gain by 
reducing his production, and hence the individual has no incentives to reduce 
the utilisation below the optimal point of private production. 
 
In general the literature of the fisheries contains a number of different para-
digms to solve the market failures in the common pool fisheries. It is important 
to emphasise that the fishery policy of the EU is constructed of different ele-
ments that o riginate from these different paradigms. A general presentation of 
the different paradigms is found in Charles (1992), who distinguishes three dif-
ferent paradigms that differ in their outline of the optimal utilisation of the fish 
resources. The paradigms  are the conservation paradigm, the rationalisation 
paradigm, and the social/community paradigm, and they different fundamen-
tally in the their concepts of describing or »measuring« the optimum exploita-
tion of the fishing resource. A general summary of the paradigms and their in-
struments are presented in Figure 1. It is important to recognise that although 
the approaches are mutually conflicting they all are seen to be part of the im-
plemented fishery policy in the EU. 
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Figure 1. The Paradigms 
 
The Conservation Paradigm 
The conservation paradigm is based on the biological management of fish in 
order to obtain that biomass which gives the long run maximum sustainable 
yield of fish that could be extracted from the sea. In this sense distortions in the 
fisheries are measured in terms of deviation from the long run optimal devel-
opment of the quantity of available fish in the sea. In a sense, the paradigm of-
ten advocates that the present catches should be reduced in order to achieve a 
maximum yield of biomass in the future. The biological advice on the exploita-
tion of the biomass is based on a scientific evaluation of the state of the avail-
able resource, the biological productivity, the harvesting pressure and predic-
tion on how the biomass will develop under a certain harvesting pressure (Las-
sen et al., 1997). The advice based on biological guidance is not targeted in or-
der to achieve objectives of economic or social aspects. The biological advice is 















ment of conservation is to control the total harvest of the fishermen by use of 
Total Allowable Catches (TACs), minimum size limit of fish, minimum size of 
meshes and natural amenities. In addition the control of the fishing effort can be 
based on the biological guidance, which implies scientific models that clarify 
the relationship between mortality from harvesting and the effort of the operat-
ing fishing vessels. 
The Rationalisation Paradigm 
The paradigm is based on the bio-economic models regarding the exploitation 
of the biomass given that the objective is to maximise the economic wealth. The 
magnitude of market failure is measured by the economic loss that occurs com-
pared to the first best solution which is the maximum long-term fishery rent. 
The rationalisation paradigm builds on the premise that the objective of the so-
ciety is to maximise the long run economic rent in terms of the economic bene-
fit. Often a sub optimal economic exploitation of biomass can be a result of the 
competition between the fishermen, which leads to a harvest that is higher than 
at the maximum economic yield. The objective of the rationalisation paradigm 
would be failed when the operating fishing vessels are ineffective as valuable 
economic rents will be lost if the fishing vessel’s composition is not optimal 
(Dupont, 1991). The typical instruments to approach the rationalisation para-
digm is (1) to reduce to an "optimal" fishing effort, and (2) transform the fish-
ery from a condition where no one have the property right to a private property, 
hereby the inevitable competitions of resource is eliminated (Charles, 1992). 
Seen from the international point of view, the rationalisation paradigm co-
ordinating the countries’ fishing contribution should entail advantages over non 
co-ordinated consumption. One reason for this is that the characteristic of the 
fishing resource often is that it is mobile across the countries’ fishing borders. 
Consequently, extra economic gain will be obtainable if the countries agree 
upon waiting to exploit the resource until the fish are of a certain age and thus 
of greater value. Further, economic gains are available because the countries’ 
vessels do not have the same costs seeing that only the most efficient vessels 
can achieve allocation gains (Munro, 1990). Seen from the general perspective  
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the paradigm builds on individual cost minimisation behaviour and no consid-
eration is taken with regard to political, social or employment aspects. 
The Social/Community Paradigm 
The paradigm builds on the broader spectrum of new theoretical fisheries con-
cepts. The general point of view is that in a narrow sense the conservation and 
rationalisation paradigms for overfishing do not take account of the arrange-
ment of the fishing community including the social and cultural conditions. In 
relation to the arrangement of the fishing community the rationalisation para-
digm focuses on maximum economic yield which builds on fundamental his-
torical and cultural conditions in the development in the Western world. In 
other cultures (Canada, Greenland) the main decision unit is the entire local 
community e.g. a village, not the individual (Grima and Berkes, 1989). The re-
sult is that in order to establish a sound exploitation of the fishing resource; the 
institutional framework of the society has to be considered (cf. Ostrom, 1990). 
Nevertheless, this forms a contrast to the pure cost minimising objective under 
the rationalisation paradigm. Another aspect is that neither the rationalisation 
nor the conservation paradigms consider the f act that the fishing community 
depends heavily on the fishing industry. Thus, the consequences of distribution 
such as unemployment caused by the biological and economic instruments is 
not provided for (Charles, 1988). It is therefore recommended to apply instru-
ments within the local community or the socio-economic perspective, which 
ensure that the social and local interests are considered so that the framework is 
adapted to the local society ensuring a sound exploitation of the fishing r e-
source. 
 
The paradigms, which are described in the present chapter, can be seen as fix-
points for different objectives and instruments applied by fishery managers to 
regulate and control the distortions accomplished in applied fisheries. More-
over, the paradigms form a theoretical basis that is used to understand the 
mechanisms and arguments expressed by the Member States and thereby influ-
ence the forming of the Common Fishery Policy in EU. The detailed descrip-
tion of the process that forms the legislation and instruments employed to regu- 
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late the fishery in the Union follows in chapters 2 and 3. In chapter 2 the stages 
in the development of the comprehensive fishery policy is described in histori-
cal perspective. Chapter 3 contains an outline and evaluation of the elements in 
the ruling legislation, which are founded on many of the premises that are de-
scribed in the paradigms of the present chapter. 
2.  The Historical Development of the Fisheries 
Policy in the European Community 
2.1.  Introduction 
The aim of the present chapter is to uncover the transformation that the fishery 
in the Union has taken from an open access fishery to a fishery of regulated 
state property. The latter is aimed by implementing policies to preserve the re-
sources and to balance the development of the resource and the fishing capacity 
employed in the fisheries. The brief review of the historical development in the 
fishery policy in the following clarifies the inherent resource conflicts between 
Member States. That is e.g. seen in the negotiation of the relative stabile distri-
bution of the fishing quotas between the Member States, and problems encoun-
tering from the Member States’ reluctance to abandon their competence to the 
Community institutions e.g. seen in the control policy. In general the conflict 
over t he resource and hence the incentives of the Member States are empha-
sised as a driven force in the forming and implementation of the fishery policy. 
 
In general the development of the Common fisheries policy has not been a one-
shot event, the policy has rather been evolved gradually over several stages 
based on changes in the external environment outside the Community, and the 
change in the political positions of the single Member States. 
 
Until 1977 the fisheries policy in the Community had a rather secondary posi-
tion by applying objectives that where formulated for the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP). The main objective of the fisheries policy at this point was aimed 
to increase the insufficient supply of fish to the Common market. The fisheries  
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policy consisted of the market and structural policies, which were subsidising 
the fishing industry, by minimum prices on fish and by grants for vessel con-
struction to catch more fish. During this period, the fishery in Europe was one 
of regulated open access
7, where the Community shared harvest places with 
other countries in Europe. At the time there was no reason why the Community 
should impose severe conservation restrictions on the Community vessels, 
when the vessels from the non-member countries were not restricted in their 
fisheries. 
 
The second period emerged by the introduction of the 200-mile EEZ fishery 
limit by 1977, which gradually turned the objectives in the Community’s fish-
ery policy. The implementation of the 200-mile zone founded the necessary 
condition of exclusiveness that could motivate the development of a compre-
hensive common conservation policy. In order to adopt the 200-mile fishing 
zone, the Member States in 1976 agreed on acting in unity in their negotiations 
of fishery with non-EC members. Although it was difficult at that time to settle 
a far-reaching Community policy some fundaments was established that could 
be used in the future negotiations of a more comprehensive fishery policy. 
 
In 1983, the agreements were reached, and thereby forming the basis for a com-
prehensive Common Fisheries Policy was established. The major achievement 
was that conservation got a more important role to play in the Community fish-
eries policy. Moreover, the agreement of the associated policies for structure 
and control were also agreed upon, but undoubtedly the largest achievement in 
the negotiations was the conservation policy. 
2.2.  The Development in the Fisheries Policy until 1977 
In the early stage of the European Community there was a lack of means in the 
legislation to prevent the inherent rivalry and hence over-utilisation of the re-
sources. The Common Fisheries Policies (CFP) was included under the Com-
                                                                 
 7  Although the fishery is defined as “open access”, it is remarked that 12 nautical miles fishery 
zones is implemented in Europe from 1964.  
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mon Agricultural Policy (CAP) in Article 38(1) of the Rome Treaty
8, and the 
main objectives were laid down in Article 39(1): 
 
i.  to increase productivity by promoting technical progress and to ensure ra-
tional development and the optimum utilisation of factors of production 
ii.  to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community 
iii.  to stabilise markets 
iv.  to ensure the availability of supplies for consumers at reasonable prices 
 
In order to attain these objectives, the Member States are obliged by Article 5 to 
‘take all the appropriate measures’ while in Article 7 ensuring ‘no discrimina-
tion on grounds of nationality’. The Rome Treaty was directed towards securing 
the economic and social welfare, which achieved by maintained price stability 
(the common market policy) and by increasing productivity based on the ex-
perience obtained by the development of the economy in agricultural communi-
ties. However, under the open access fishery (regime) that existed, the imple-
mented policy would rather stimulate the tendencies towards over-utilisation 
than preserve the resources. The initiatives towards conservation were initiated 
as negotiations between European States
9 independently of Community institu-
tions. An example of this is the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission
10 
(NEAFC), which during the 1960s and early 1970s recommended the appliance 
of preservation schemes such as the size of meshes, minimum size limit, pres-
ervation, etc. in the light of scientific estimations of the stock. The means of the 
NEAFC were, however, limited by the fact that they could only recommend but 
had no formal competence. The reason for this is that each participating country 
was sovereign and could refuse to comply with the recommendations. Thus, the 
results of the co-operation were limited as only the measurements agreed to by 
all parties could be implemented effectively. However, as the countries wanted 
to further their own interests, as a symptom of a classic free rider problem, none 
                                                                 
 8  The Treaty of Rome, 25 March 1957. 
 9  The negotiations were conducted multilaterally between both independent states and Member 
States without the participation of the EU. 
10  Participating countries: Belgium, Denmark, East Germany, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Soviet Union, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and 
West Germany.  
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of the countries wanted to cover the loss from the preservation schemes and 
consequently they could not agree about particularly far-reaching limitations in 
the fishery. 
 
Meanwhile, the first Community legislative Act in fisheries was initiated in 
1971
11. The regulation followed the requirements within the agricultural tradi-
tion by the founding of a common organisation of the market in fishery prod-
ucts that supported prices and protected and conformed to the Community mar-
ket. Moreover, a Community structural policy was set up that aimed to co-
ordinate the structural policies of the Member States. Third, and most important 
the principle of equal was stated in Article 2(1) of the structural regulation 
2141/70: 
 
‘Rules applied by each Member State in respect of fishing in the maritime 
waters coming under its sovereignty or within its jurisdiction shall not lead 
to differences in treatment of other Member States. Member States shall en-
sure in particular equal conditions of access to and use of the fishing 
grounds situated in the waters referred to in the preceding subparagraph 
for all fishing vessels flying the flag of a Member State and registered in 
Community territory.’ 
 
On these grounds the general principle for the fisheries (like the remaining mat-
ters in the Community) is that distortion of competition may not occur. This 
principle was now continued so that the vessels in the Member states had equal 
"access" and were n ot discriminated in the fishing zones of other Member 
States. Finally, a concern about conservation and overfishing in the fishing 
zones of the Member States is stated in Article 5 of 2141/70 where catch could 
be restricted in certain areas and periods or with respect to fishing gear for spe-
cies that where heavily depleted. 
 
The next event affecting the body of the Community’s fishing policy was the 
enlargement of the Community with Denmark, Ireland, and the United King-
dom. Actually, the accession negotiation began the very day after the original  
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six Members States
12 had agreed on 2141/70. This had the implication that the 
new Member States had to accept the acquis communitaire in the terms of the 
Treaties and all legislation based upon them which had been adopted prior to 
the accession. However, the United Kingdom had difficulties with accepting the 
intentions of equal access in Community waters as laid down in 2141/70. The 
reason was that this would allow fishermen from other Member States access to 
fish within the 12 nautical miles fishing zones, formerly exclusively fished by 
British inshore fishermen although some foreign fishermen were allowed fish-
ing rights between six and twelve miles in certain areas and for certain species. 
In general the position of the British inshore fishermen was that the Community 
had not employed a proper conservation policy. This would allow foreign ves-
sels to use finer meshed nets than the British and trailing chains along the sea 
floor in order to chase fish into their trawls. The concern of the inshore fisher-
man was that this would wipe out the inshore fish resources (Young, 1973). The 
position of the British Government in the negotiations of the Act of Accession 
was to keep a status quo by respecting the British fishing right within the 12-
mile zone although this was not in accordance with the acquis communitaire. 
The settlement of the equal access dispute was the determination of some tem-
porary exceptions in the Act of Accession
13. Thus, the principles of equal in all 
waters o f other Member states were temporarily
14 limited by defining certain 
areas where the Member states could exclude the catch from other Member 
States within 6 nautical miles, which could be extended to 12 nautical miles in 
certain areas. Moreover, according to Article 102 the Commission shall within 
the end of 1978 make use of its competence to secure a sustainable utilisation of 
the resources. This has the implication that the Member States’ competence to 
regulate the fisheries would be temporary and assigned to the Community. 
However, in general the dispute over equal access was only the top of the ice-
berg of what was to come in the development of a comprehensive fishing policy 
in the Community. 
 
                                                                 
11  O.J. L236, No. 2141/70, 20.10 1970; O.J. L236, No. 2142/70, 20.10 1970. 
12  Belgium, German Federal Republic, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Italy. 
13  O.J. L 073, 27.3 1972. 
14  In force to 31 December 1982, Article 101, Act of Accession.  
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2.3.  The Fisheries Policy after the Introduction of the 200 EEZ 
Zones (1977) 
The next push towards a more comprehensive Community fisheries policy was 
installed as a consequence of the establishment of the 200-mile limits from 1 
January 1977 decided at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea. This led to exclusive economic zones (EEZ) in the fishery, in the sense 
that vessels in Community were prevented from accessing catches within 200 
nautical miles of the coasts of Iceland, Norway and Faeroe Islands. This was of 
major importance for the vessels of  the United Kingdom and the German Fed-
eral Republic. The adoption of 200-miles economic zones raised two important 
issues for the Community. First, it would have to make reciprocal negotiations 
to get access to the distant waters. Second, the Community had to implement 
the 200 nautical mile zone of the Member States and decide how this change 
would influence the fishery policy in the Community? 
 
First, the intention of the Commission was to play an active role in the negotia-
tions of the reciprocal resources with the third countries. The argument was that 
the Community would stand stronger in negotiations with non-members such 
as: Norway or the East European countries, when acting in unity (Gundelach, 
1977). In addition it would be of mutual benefit to the Member States if they 
could prevent the third countries from getting access to the resources in the 
Member States’ waters. Finally, the Community could obtain access to fish re-
sources in third countries’ fishing zones by allowing structural grants or favour-
able trade accesses to the Community market. The latter conditions could only 
be applied, when the Member States acted in unity, because it would demand a 
general acceptance of the Council. 
 
As seen in Table 1, the majority of the Member States were interested in the 
access to resources in the zones of the non-member states. Therefore, it was not 
difficult to get a mutual understanding that it could be an advantage that the 
Community was given the competence to negotiate with non-member states. At 
the final meetings at The Hague in October 1976, all Member States but Ireland 
were anxious to adopt the necessary institutional arrangements for the Commis- 
20 
sion to engage in the external negotiations. Ireland argued that it did not have 
any distant water fleet to deny the Commission its mandate to the external ne-
gotiations until such a time when Ireland received guarantees in the Commu-
nity’s internal fisheries policy. As a result Ireland accepted the procedure for 
external negotiations
15 on the condition that they be admitted the guarantees for 
a progressive development of its small fleet by a doubling of the 1975 catches 
by 1979. 
                                                                 
15  Not published in any official journal, however, a summary was published in 1981, O.J. C 
105/1, 1.2. 1981.  
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Table 1. Catches by Zone and Country (1973 Figures)  
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waters (assuming 
a 200-mile limit) 
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418.2  21.2  5.1  113.3  27.1  283.7  67.8 
France 
593.9  159.3  26.8  274.7  46.3  159.9  26.9 
Ireland 
80.1  72.0  89.9  8.1  10.1 
- 
Netherlands 
220.4  78.6  35.7  134.8  61.2  7.0  3.1 
United 
Kingdom  1048.7  667.0  63.6  3.4  0.3  378.3  36.1 
Italy 
289.9  191.1  65.9 
   
98.8  34.1 
Overall To-
tal  4153.7 
 
2206.0  53.1  812.9  19.6 
 
1134.8  27.3 
Source: Driscoll and McKellar (1979) 
 
The question of the internal fisheries policy in the Community was more diffi-
cult to settle. In the outline of the implementation of the 200-mile zones, the 
Member States had different interests as seen in Table 1. On the one hand par-
ticularly the British fishermen anticipated a double pressure from the 
implementation of 200-mile economic zones. First of all, the UK vessels would 
have a relatively great economic loss due to the foregone catches in the distant 
waters. Second, the British fishermen felt that they would be obliged to share 
the rich abundance of resources within the British 200-mile zones with  
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rich abundance of resources within the British 200-mile zones with fishermen 
from other Member States. In addition, the British fishermen had only minor 
interest in the getting access to the 200-mile territories of the other Member 
states. The latter could have been seen as a compensation for the British losses 
in distant and domestic waters. The Dutch and French fishermen, on the other 
hand, would be heavily affected if they were denied the access to the 200-mile 
fishing zones of the other Member States. 
 
The Commission presented the first proposal
16 in February 1976 which among 
other things covered: 
 
i.  the fixing of the of twelve-mile exclusive coastal zones that the Member 
States could reserve to vessels traditionally fishing and operating in that 
geographical area 
ii.  the establishment of the 200 nautical mile fishing zones within which the 
Community should manage the resource through the setting of Community 
based quotas 
 
The position of the British Government was that they could not accept the 12-
mile zones and alternatively they proposed the establishment of extensive ex-
clusive national zones of at least 50 miles. The standpoint of the British Gov-
ernment was influenced by the opinion in various British fishermen’s organisa-
tions. At a meeting in Edinburgh April 1975 these organisations had agreed that 
Britain should press for a 200-mile limit fully enforceable against non-EEC 
members, and for a 100 mile limit fully enforceable against all Member States 
(Driscoll and McKellar, 1979). The position of the French and Dutch govern-
ments were in favour of the intention of equal access as laid down in 2141/70. 
 
The Irish and British governments outlined a proposal that took account of the 
national fishermen’s demand for exclusive fishing zones and the Community 
partners’ demand for equal access. The proposal contoured a variable coastal 
belt with a range between 12 and 50 miles, which should vary according to cer-
tain regional factors, such a the social and economic conditions prevailing in  
23 
individual ports. The proposal was attempted as a compromise between the 
principle of non-national discrimination and the principle of regional develop-
ment. Although the Irish and British governments toured around the European 
capitals campaigning for their proposal, there was no progress in the negotia-
tions. 
 
At the final meeting in The Hague, the Member States were not able to reach 
any new agreements on internal exclusive zones in the Community. Moreover, 
proposals had been presented by the Commission to implement a common con-
servation policy. The basic instrument was to fix the annual Total Allowable 
Catch (TAC) for each stock or group of stocks, and to distribute the permission 
catches fairly among the fishermen of the Member States, using a system of 
quotas. The Member States were not able to reach any agreement on the im-
plementation of such a Community quota policy. The final result agreed upon 
by the Member States in The Hague resolution can be summarised as, 
 
i.  individual states were allowed to take non-discriminatory national conser-
vation measures within their own zones (12 nautical miles)  
ii.  the settlement of a process for an internal distribution of the TAC, the 
Hague preferences, which later was to be used in the final negotiation of the 
conservation policy (internal distribution of the resources). This contained, 
1) an attempt to take account of the traditional fishing pattern of the Com-
munity fleet by taking account of the Members States catches during a pe-
riod of reference; 2) certain preferences (later termed the “Hague prefer-
ences”) were to be applied to fishermen in certain regions where there were 
(and still are) few job opportunities for alternative employment; 3) the 
losses suffered by Member States’ fishing vessels in third countries after 
the introduction of the 200-mile EEZ have also been considered. 
 
The Hague resolution had the political implication that the Member States were 
assigned the competence to impose conservation measures within their own ter-
ritorial zone. As a  consequence of this assignment the Irish Government i m-
posed a regulation “Sea Fisheries (Conservation and Rational Exploitation) or-
                                                                 
16  COM (76) 59.  
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der 1977”. That imposed the restriction that vessels larger than 33 metres and 
with engines larger than 1100 HP were prohibited the access to the Irish fisher-
ies zones covering 56￿30, northern latitude, 12￿ west longitude and 50￿30 
northern latitude. The conservation requirements were based on scientific ad-
vice justified by Irish biologists and based on the premise that the largest ves-
sels with maximum efficiency tend to make the largest inroads into stocks. The 
implication was that it excluded nearly every Dutch and French vessels fishing 
off Ireland, whereas only two Irish vessels were excluded from the fishery in 
the area (of which one has never been operating in the area). Seen from the per-
spective of the Dutch and French governments, the conservation regulation was 
interpreted as an attempt to exclude foreign fishing vessels from the Irish fish-
ing areas. The Dutch government opposed against the Irish regulation by taking 
it before the European Court of Justice
17. 
 
The European Justice of Court decided that Ireland had violated the intentions 
in the Community legislation. The premise for the decision of the Court was 
that regulation imposed by Ireland was unequal as between Irish fishermen and 
other Community fishermen, which had traditionally fished there. The Irish Sea 
Fisheries regulation was discriminating towards nationality, which contradicts 
Article 7 of the Treaty of Rome Treaty and Article 2(1) of Regulation 101/76. 
The Court recognised that Member States’ competence to imposed conservation 
regulations that where not discriminatory. 
 
2.4.  The Comprehensive Common Fisheries Policy 
established in 1983 
The settlement of the comprehensive Common Fishery Policy was founded in 
1983 by the establishment of the conservation policy, 170/83, which was sup-
plemented by the structural policy, 2908/83, and the control policy, 2057/82. 
                                                                 
17  Case 61/77 European Court reports 1978 page 0417.  
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The Conservation Policy 
By the agreement on the conservation policy, the Community was given the 
formal competence to govern the conservation policy e.g. by fixing the yearly 
annual Total Allowable Catches (TAC) to the Member States. In this sense 
there were found a compromise to the negotiations that were initiated by the 
Hague resolution in 1976. The agreement is laid down in 170/83
18, which se-
cures the sharing of resources based on the concept of relative stability that 
gives each Member State a constant relative share of the quotas. This is explic-
itly addressed in Article 4(1) which states that 
 
‘the volume of the catches available to the Community referred to in Article 
3 shall be distributed between the Member States in a manner which assu-
res each Member State relative stability of fishing activities for each of the 
stocks considered’. 
 
In order to take account of the previous disputes of the sharing of resources, the 
sharing laid down in the relative stability explicitly incorporate the special 
needs as defined in the Hague resolution
19. 
 
The local and social needs of the fishery dependent regions were also taken in 
consideration by the maintaining of the 12-mile exclusive fishing zones and by 
the establishment of the Shetland box. The fisheries in the exclusive zones, 
stated in Article 6, involve a detailed ruling of the vessels from other Member 
States having access to single species, and inter alia seasonal restrictions within 
the 12 mile fishing zone of the single Member State. The conditions for fisher-
ies in the Shetland box, stated in Article 7, involve the management with a li-
cense system applied for vessels larger than 26 metres, moreover limits are set 
to the number of vessels that are allowed to operate in the area at the same 
                                                                 
18  O.J. L 24, No. 170/83, 25.1 1983. 
19  The special needs is laid down in Annex VII to the Hague resolution of 3 November 1976.  
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time
20. In this sense, some of the UK reservations to the equal access were im-
plemented as a part of the new conservation policy. 
 
In general 170/83 must be seen as a political compromise between the Member 
States that safeguard the local and social interests in the Member States. More-
over, it is important to recognise that the agreement of 170/83 lays down for the 
first time a formal way to handle the resources allocation between the Member 
States. 
 
Finally, it is noted that 170/83 was in force for a ten years’ period. This implied 
that by December 31, 1991, the Commission should present a report the Coun-
cil. The report should describe the situation in the fisheries involving the size of 
the stocks and its expected development, the economic and social development 
of the coastal regions. Moreover, the relative stability and the provision of fish-
ery dependent areas in 170/83 are in force until 1992. The provision to change 
the distribution of resources among the Member States stated in Article 4(2) 
shall be based on the report presented by the Commission, and decided by the 
Council based on majority voting as stated in Article 43 of the Treaty. 
The Structural Policy 
In order to supplement the conservation objective, the structural policy 
2908/83
21 was agreed to secure a co-ordination between the development in the 
resources and the fishing capacity. This is stated in the structural policy by the 
implementation of the Multi Annual Guidance Programmes (MAGP), which 
intend to set objectives for the development in the fishing capacity in measures 
of GRT and kW. The provision for MAGP was made earlier in 2141/70 and 
101/76, but it was first by the agreement on 2908/83 that the development ob-
tained a major place in the common fisheries regulation. The objective was 
clearly defined in Article 3(a): 
 
                                                                 
20  Annex II of 170/83 the limit of access to the to Shetland box is given by 52 French vessels, 62 
UK vessels, 12 German vessels and 2 Belgian vessels in the area. 
21  O.J. L 290, No. 2908/83, 22.10 1983.  
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‘With respect of the fishing sector, a satisfactory balance between the fish-
ing capacity to be deployed by the production facilities cohered by the pro-
grammes and the stock which are expected to be available during the period 
of validity for the programme’. 
 
In general the objective of the 2908/83 was not that of the conservationist view. 
The general objective was to secure the fishermen a stabile income as stated in 
the preamble. 
 
‘Whereas, in order to set limits to the economic insecurity in which the 
Community fishermen work, the fleets concerned must be restructured, un-
der a common measure, by renewal and, where necessary economically ap-
propriate expansion in line with actual catch potential, which will ensure 
optimum productivity in the long term of these production facilities’. 
 
The Community was willing to give financial support to investment projects, 
purchase or construction of new fishing vessels, and the modernisation or con-
version of fishing vessels already in the use. In general, getting the Member 
States to agree on the structural policy did not cause much trouble, as noted by 
Holden (1996, 56) 
 
‘almost since the inception of the structural and market policy they have 
caused few problems, essentially because they provide financial support to 
the fishing industries of all Member States, which facilitate agreements’
22’. 
The Control Policy 
To secure the compliance of the conservation policy, the Community imple-
mented a control policy, which is stated in 2057/82
23. The control policy con-
tains the means of inspection of the vessels at sea, and inspection of the vessels 
and their landings in the ports. The competence to undertake the control was 
given to the Member States, which within their zone of jurisdiction had to in-
                                                                 
22  Mike Holden the chief of DG XIV the Conservation Unit in the Commission in 1986 and Advi-
ser to the Director General until 1990.  
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spect the vessels from the Member States. Moreover, the Member States had to 
control that the landed quantities of the vessels in the Member State was not 
exceeding the Total Allowable Catches of the Member State. 
 
In general the control regulation was giving the main competence to the Mem-
ber States. On the other hand the Commission was merely having the position 
of controlling that the Member States fulfilled their obligation to control. In 
case a Member State did not meet this obligation, the Commission would fol-
low the procedure stated in Article 12(2): 
 
‘If the Commission considers that irregularities have occurred in the im-
plementing of this Regulation, it shall inform the Member State or States 
concerned, which shall then conduct an administrative inquiry in which 
Commission officials may participate. The Member State or States concer-
ned of the progress and results of the inquiry’. 
 
Article 12(2) clarifies the weak position of the Community institutions in the 
control policy, the Commission was not allowed to implement sanction against 
the Member State, but the mean of the Commission was only to take part in an 
administrative inquiry. 
 
The efficiency of the control policy in the fisheries can be described by the fol-
lowing quote from Holden (1996, 159) 
 
‘the reason for which the Council was able to agree (on 2057/82) was be-
cause the regulation gave no effective powers to the Commission. The poli-
tical objective was to establish a system of control and enforcement without 
conceding any competence to the Commission. That this means that the sy-
stem would be largely, if not totally ineffective, was almost certainly the 
objective of most states’. 
                                                                 
23  O.J. L 220, No. 2057/82, 29.7 1982.  
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2.5.  The Entry of Portugal and Spain into the Community 
In the conservation policy of 1983, the relative stability was defined as the rela-
tive sharing of the quotas between the ten Member States
24, and hence the 1983 
regulation did not take account of relative shares for prospective new Member 
States. By the entry of Portugal and Spain in 1986 the Community gained two 
new Member States, which had significant interest in the fisheries policy, and it 
was not long before the newcomers challenged the fundament of the Common 
fisheries policy. Based on what Holden (1996) calls ‘a badly drafted Act of Ac-
cession for Portugal and Spain’, Portugal and Spain raised doubt of the legisla-
tion in different ways. 
 
Portugal and Spain had the opinion that the Council based its distribution of 
quotas between the Member States on a wrong interpretation of the relative sta-
bility. The consequence was that Spain and Portugal during 1990 and 1992 
brought a number of cases for the European Court of Justice in order to change 
the quota distribution. 
 
In the cases C-63/90 and C-67/90
25, Portugal and Spain against the Council, the 
two new Member States argued that there was a wrong distribution of the 
Community fishing rights in the third waters of Greenland, the Faroe Islands, 
Norway and Sweden. In the example of the fisheries in Greenland’s waters, 
Spain and Portugal have prior to the establishment of the 200-mile EEZ had 
significant catches in the waters of Greenland. However, by the introduction of 
the 200-mile EEZ in 1977, the Spanish and Portuguese fishermen lost their 
fisheries in the waters of Greenland. By Greenland’s exit of the Community by 
January 1, 1985, the Community kept some fishing rights in the Greenland wa-
ters, which was accomplished by granting Greenland financial support. The 
agreement gave Greenland access to a certain level of minimum catch quantity 
within the fishing zone of Greenland. This had the implication that in case of a 
                                                                 
24  Belgium, Denmark, German Federal Republic, Greece, Ireland, Italy, France, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands and United Kingdom. 
25  See e.g. C-63/90 and C-67/90, European Court Reports 1992, page I-5073.  
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reduction in the availability of resources, the Community’s fishing rights were 
reduced accordingly without reducing the financial support to Greenland. On 
the other hand in case of an increase in the available resources, the Commu-
nity’s catch rights were increased. 
 
The position of  Portugal and Spain was that their catches in the Greenland’s 
fishing zones prior to 1977 should be included in the relative stability, and 
hence they demanded a dismissal of the Community’s 1990 distribution of the 
quotas in Greenland fishing zones
26. They  argued that the entry of the new 
Member States fulfilled the necessary conditions for a reinterpretation of the 
relative stability of the Community resources in the third countries. Secondly, 
Spain argued that given that large increases in the Community’s quotas in the 
zones in 1990, the relative stability would not be violated by allowing Portugal 
and Spain quotas in the Greenland water, because the other Member states in 
the Community had not utilised the Community quotas. 
 
The European Court of Justice dismissed the cases. The premise for the dis-
missal was that by Article 2 in the Act of Accession
27, Spain and Portugal had 
accepted the acquis communitaire, which include regulation 170/83 and hence 
the relative stability. Moreover, there was no provision in the Act of Accession 
that the relative stability should be altered. Secondly, given the Spanish argu-
ment that the Community did not catch its quota, the Court stated that there is 
doubt about the availability of the allowable catches. I.e. the Community ves-
sels have not been able to catch the allowed quotas could be connected to an 
overestimation of the predicted catch opportunities. In order to underline the 
premises the Court specified the concept of the relative stability that is the 
Member States contained in the relative stability are secured a constant share of 
the available catches. This means that there is not undertaken a new distribution 
of relative stability e.g. based on increases in the available quotas. Moreover, it 
was stated that there was n o provision for the fact that actual catches were 
lower than anticipated catches should form basis for new distribution of the 
quotas between the Member States. In general the Court recognised that the two 
                                                                 
26  O.J. L 389, No. 4054/89, 19.12 1989. 
27  O.J. L 302, 15.11 1985.  
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new Member States had provision to be included in the distribution of new fish-
ing possibilities with non-EC countries and in any eventual review of the distri-
bution system in accordance with Article 4(2) of the EC regulation 170/83. 
2.6.  The Tendencies in the Historical Development of the 
Common Fisheries Policy 
The historical development of the Common Fishery Policy shows that the 
Member States have different preferences on whether to maintain a fishery of 
equal access or to establish a fishery of exclusiveness. The prospects of equal 
access to the fishing areas in the Community is stated in Article 2(1) of 
21417/0, which imply that the Member States are not allowed to impose restric-
tions that lead to differences in treatment of fishing vessels from other Member 
States. This is also in line with the principle that prohibits discrimination on 
ground of nationality, stated in Article 7 of the Rome Treaty. On the other hand, 
the problems encountered in the fishing sector diverge significantly from the 
other sectors encountered by the common legislation of the Community, and in 
the forming of the Common Fishery Policy it was seen to be necessary to use 
exclusiveness as a tool to overcome the market failures that are specifically re-
lated to the fishery. Although, the exclusiveness often involves discrimination 
towards nationality there are numerous examples of its use in the fishery. This 
is e.g. seen in the establishment of the 12-mile zone implemented by the Act of 
Accession for Denmark, Ireland and United Kingdom in 1972, and moreover by 
the founding of the Shetland box, stated in 170/83. 
 
In general, the Common Fishery Policy is seen to be a picture of the political 
compromises between the Member States, and thereby the policy contains ele-
ments that reveal some Member States’ (France and the Netherlands) prefer-
ences for equal access and other Member States’ (Ireland and United Kingdom) 
preferences to protect their resources. It is emphasised that the trade-off b e-
tween preferences for equal access and exclusiveness is still present in the cur-
rent fishery policy,  and in this sense the fundament for the discussion of the 
fishery regulation has not changed since 1970-72. In the following we will go  
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into a detailed evaluation on the way the present Common Fisheries Policy is 
dealing with the conflict of resource sharing between the Member States. 
3.  The Ruling Regulation of the Fisheries within 
the European Union 
3.1.  Introduction 
The Common Fisheries Policy is founded on Article 38 of the Treaty, which 
establishes the legal basis for the competence of the EU within the fishing sec-
tor. In practice, the Common Fisheries Policy establishes a general framework, 
which outlines the competence of the EU’s institutions and it applies instru-
ments for the EU to affect the development of the fishing sectors in the Member 
States.  The Common Fisheries Policy consists of the conservation policy, the 
market policy, the structural policy, the control policy and a policy dealing with 
negotiations with non-member states. In general, the conservation policy is the 
spine of the Common Fisheries Policy as it gives the EU the competence to dis-
tribute the current quotas between the Member States. Another important ele-
ment of the policies implemented under the Common Fisheries Policy is that 
they open for EU funding of the fishing sectors in Member States. The elements 
of the EU’s funding of the fisheries are summarised in Figure 2. In total the EU 
granted 752.6 Mill ECU to the fisheries sector by 1996, 60% of the grants is 
given to the structural development of the fishing sectors in the Member States. 
The structural grants are e.g. based on the goal 1 purpose, which covers subsi-
dies to the least developed regions in the EU. Moreover, grants based on the 
goal 5a objective are provided with the purpose to support the adjustment of the 




                                                                 
28  O.J. L 185, No. 2052/88, 17.7 1988.  
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Source: O.J. C 348, 18.11 1997. 
 
Another important element of grants is based on the international fisheries 
agreements between the EU and third countries, where the EU e.g. gives grants 
to non-member states with the purpose to get access to the resources within the 
fishing zones of these countries. Moreover, the EU gives grants according to the 
market policy, which is e.g. based on the purpose to secure minimum prices in 
the common market of fish, as stated in 3759/92
29. This means e.g. that the EU 
pulls fish out of the market, when the market price is less than a required 
“minimum price”. Finally, minor grants are provided with the purpose to secure 
the necessary control and enforcement of the fisheries in the EU. 
 
The purpose in the following sections is to look at the Common Fishery Policy 
and to monitor the single policy elements designed to affect the consequences 
of the resource conflicts between the Member States. This means, that the mar-
ket policy and the policy for agreements with third countries are not explicitly 
addressed as these policies only indirectly affect the tendencies towards exces-
sive depletion and over-capacity in the fishery of the EU. On the other hand, the 
                                                                 
29  O.J. L 388, No. 3759/92, 17.12 1992.  
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analysis explicitly addresses the conservation policy, the structural policy and 
the control policy, because these policies are essential in impacting the fisher-
men’s and the Member States’ actions i n the game of the common fishery. 
More concretely the analysis covers a discussion of the instruments applied e.g. 
to conserve the fish stocks and to distribute the resources between the Member 
States. The resource conflict is also indirectly affected by the EU’s subsidies for 
developing the fishing sectors, the Multi Annual Guidance Programmes 
(MAGP), and the legislation to prevent state aid to the fishing fleets. The latter 
refers to aid that distorts the competition and thereby is used by the Member 
States in an internal conflict over the resources. It is important to recognise that 
the main part of EU’s costs is used for structural purposes. Although, as noted 
by Karagiannakos (1995), it would be more obvious to reduce the conflict over 
the resources by increasing the subsidies for control, because this would secure 
a compliance with the imposed regulation. In this sense, it is crucial to apply the 
control policy to safeguard that the fishermen are prevented from unrestricted 
access and use of the resources. Moreover, significant sanctions in the Member 
States are essential in order to secure compliance in every Member State. Al-
though, the control policy should always be applied based on a cost-benefit 
analysis, which secures that the cost for control is never higher than the EU loss 
in wealth from not compliance (Coase, 1960). 
3.2.  The Conservation Policy 
The conservation policy is among the most important items of the Common 
Fisheries Policy laying down the fundamental premise for the sharing of the re-
sources between the Member States. The principal foundation of the conserva-
tion policy is stated in 3760/92
30. It is emphasised that the Member States have 
transferred their competence to make decisions concerning the conservation 
regulation to the Council. That is, according to Article 4, the Council estab-
lishes 
 
‘Community measures laying down the conditions of access to waters and 
resources and of the pursuit of exploitation activities’. 
                                                                 
30  O.J. L 389, 31.12 1992.  
35 
Moreover, decisions concerning the conservation policy are made in the Coun-
cil based on qualified majority voting on the proposals presented by the Com-
mission. The Member States have the competence, as stated in Article 10, to 
take measures for conservation and management of the resources in the waters 
of their jurisdiction,  provided that the measures are more stringent than the 
measures implemented by the EU. The national measures can only apply for 
fishermen in the concerned Member State. The latter condition has the implica-
tion that the single Member State has the competence to implement a national 
conservation policy, based on Article 10, but only when the national measures 
are compatible with the intentions and objectives in the conservation policy of 
the EU. 
 
The intention of the EU’s conservation policy is defined in the preamble of 
3760/92, 
 
‘the objective should be to provide for rational and responsible exploitation 
of living aquatic resources and of aquaculture, while recognising the inte-
rest of the fisheries sector in its long-term development and its economic 
and social conditions’. 
 
This implies that the conservation policy has to take explicit consideration of 
the economic and social condition of the fishing dependent areas. This is also 
lined out in the principle of regional development where the cardinal point is to 
maintain restricted access to fish resources within the 12-mile zone of the 
Member States’ coasts. This restriction is maintained until December 31, 2002. 
In general, the objectives in the conservation policy are defined in Article 2(1): 
 
to protect and conserve available and accessible living marine aquatic resources 
to provide for rational and responsible exploitation on a sustainable basis, in 
appropriate economic and social conditions for the sector, taking account of its 
implication for the marine eco-system, and in particular taking account of the 
needs of both producers and consumers 
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The Commission assisted by the Scientific, Technical and Economic Commit-
tee for Fisheries (STECF) formulates the measures necessary to achieve these 
objectives based on the available scientific data. The Committee submits an an-
nual report, outlining the situation regarding the fishing resources, the devel-
opment in the fishing activity, and the economic implication of the fishery re-
source situation. 
 
The instruments outlined in the conservation policy lay down the conditions of 
access to the EU waters and resources and the pursuit of exploitation activities. 
The concrete instruments applied by the EU for each fishery or group of fisher-
ies are summarised in Table 2. In addition to these instruments a license system 
is introduced. As noted in the preamble to 3760/92 
 
‘the introduction of a general Community system of administrative fishing 
licences attached to the vessel and issued and managed by Member States 
may contribute to improve regulation of exploitation and transparency’. 
 
In general, the common instruments employed in the conservation policy, Table 
2, can be grouped under four headlines: the quota instrument, the use of pro-
tected areas, management of fishing effort, and technical measures.  
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Table 2.  The applied Instruments in the Conservation Policy  
Instruments 
a) Establish zones in which fishing activities are prohibited or 
restricted 
b) Limit exploitation rates, which refer to the catches of a stock 
over a given period of time as a proportion of the total stock 
c) Set quantitative limits on catches, e.g. as TACs 
d) Limit time spent at sea taking account, where appropriate, of 
the remoteness of the fishing waters 
e) Fix the number and type of vessels authorised to fish 
f) Lay down technical measures regarding fishing gear and its 
method of use 
g) Set a minimum size or weight of each species that may be 
caught 
h) Establish incentives, including those of economic nature, to 
promote more selective fishing 
Source: Article 4 (2) of 3760/92 
 
The main instrument in the conservation policy is the quota instrument that sets 
quantitative limitations defined by Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for each spe-
cies on a yearly basis. The procedure in the TAC distribution is that the total 
number of catches available to the EU is distributed between the Member 
States, as stated in Article 8(4ii), to assure relative stability of fishing activities 
for each of the stocks considered. Furthermore, when it becomes necessary to 
limit the TAC for a stock or group of stocks, the shares should remain fixed 
each year in order to sustain relative stability, and to safeguard the particular 
needs of regions with local populations especially dependent on fisheries and 
related industries. The Member States are allowed to exchange quotas with re-
spect to species, provided that prior notice is given to the Commission. An il-
lustration of the distribution of TACs between the Member States are outlined 
in Figure 3., the calculated distribution between the Member States is based on 
the measuring of the different species in cod equivalents. The shares devoted to 
the EU in the Figure are Union quotas that have not been distributed between 








Source: O.J. L 375, No. 3977/87, 31.12 1987 
 
The TAC policy is fundamentally based on yearly quotas, but the instrument 
has been broadened by 3760/92 in two ways. First, the Multi Annual TAC 
(MATAC) has been introduced, having the advantage that it allows the fisher-
men a longer planning horizon. Second, the multi-species TAC (MSTAC) is 
applied, which allows the catch limitation to be designed to take account of the 
technological conditions of the involved vessel gear such as complementary in 
catch (see Squires, 1987a). Although the introduction of the MATAC and 
MSTAC as quoted from 3760/92, could 
 
‘have important effects on the economic and social development of those 
regions of the Member States where fishing is an important industry’, 
                                                                 























these new instruments have not been widely used. The implementation of the 
quotas has mainly been accomplished by use of the traditional TAC, defined for 
each species on a yearly basis. 
 
The use of protected areas in the conservation policy is stated in 3760/92. The 
intention of the protected areas is to cover areas of particular national interests 
and areas that are sensible in the biological sense e.g. the Shetland box. First, 
the zones of national interest are based on a socio-economic objective, giving 
each Member State authority to maintain restrictions on access to waters under 
its sovereignty or jurisdiction within a maximum limit of 12 nautical miles. 
Vessels from other Member States are not prohibited the access to 12-mile 
zones, but detail rules for access of vessels from other Member States have 
been declared
32. Second, in the sensible fishing area of the Shetland box, special 
management for the species that are biologically sensitive and have special ex-
ploitation characteristics is implemented
33. The special management in the Shet-
land box is applied for all demersal species, except Norway pout and blue whit-
ing, and the fisheries in this area is managed by a licensing system for all fish-
ing vessels larger than 26 metres. The Commission governs the license system 
on behalf of the EU. 
 
The management of the fishing effort is introduced by the Act of Accession of 
Portugal and Spain
34; effort management is used to secure the relative stability 
in the particular areas
35. The procedure and conditions for the effort manage-
ment entered into force by January 1, 1996, and it is laid down in 685/95
36. The 
general intention of effort management is stated in the preamble to 685/95, 
 
‘it is necessary to safeguard existing balances and the acquis communitaire, 
particular the principle of relative stability; whereas it is necessary to ensu-
re that there is no increase in the overall levels of existing fishing effort 
                                                                 
32  Stated in Annex 1 to 3760/92. 
33  Stated in Article 7 and Annex 2 of 3760/92. 
34  O.J. L 302, 15.11 1985. 
35  The areas are ICES divisions Vb, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X and the CECAF areas 34.1.1, 34.1.2, 
34.2.0. 
36  O.J. L 71, No. 685/95, 31.3 1995.  
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within the areas and stocks covered by the Act of accession of Spain and 
Portugal’. 
 
The management of fishing effort means that only vessels with authorisation 
are allowed to operate in the fishing areas
37. The effort management is practised 
by a detailed measurement of fishing effort, which is measured by the product 
of the fishing capacity and the fishing time
38. The Member States are responsi-
ble to implement necessary conditions to secure that vessels flying the Member 
State’s flag are reporting their entries into, and exits from, these fishing areas. 
This also implies that the vessels shall announce their entries into, and exits 
from fishing ports located in these fishing areas. 
 
The conservation policy is also accomplished by the use of technical measures, 
which cover means that inter alia affect the fishing vessels’ catch composition, 
which is e.g. applied by use of instruments as mesh sizes, by-catch rates and 
fish sizes permitted. In general, the detailed rules of the technical measures are 
stated in 8 50/98
39, and the range of different instruments applied under the 
regulation of technical measures are summarised in Table 3. The technical 
measures are applied for eight different regions under the jurisdiction of the 
Member States, and the technical measures are designed in accordance with 
specific biological conditions within these different geographical regions. 
                                                                 
37  The demersal and pelagic species managed by the effort management is outlined in Annex 1 to 
685/95. 
38  Fishing effort is defined (in Annex II of 685/95) as the product of capacity and activity (fishing 
days). The fishing capacity covers the install power expressed in kilowatts for vessels using 
towed gear. For vessels using fixed gear, the capacity of vessel is expressed in kilowatts (kW) 
and tonnage. 
39  O.J. L 125, 850/98, 30.3 1998.  
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Table 3.  The Different Technical Measures Stated in 850/98  
Technical measures  Include 
Gear and conditions for use of 
the gear 
conditions of mesh size in dif-
ferent regions; by-catch regula-
tions in the different fisheries; 
mesh size and by-catch depend-
ing on gear.  
Minimum size of species  minimum size of species in dif-
ferent regions. 
Special restriction on certain 
species 
restriction on the fisheries in 
specific fishing areas for certain 
species e.g. herring, sprat, 
mackerel, tuna and plaice.  
Restriction by use of certain 
fishing methods 
restriction on the use of gear in-
ter alia the use of beam trawl-
ing, purse seining in certain ar-
eas. 
Conditions for Skagerrak and 
Kattegat 
specific restriction based on gear 
and mesh size.  
Technical conditions  prohibits the processing of fish-
meal, fish oil on fishing vessels. 
 
The changes of the technical measures are applied by presenting a draft of the 
proposal for change of the technical measures, as summarised in Table 4, for 
the Advisory Committee for Fishery Management (ACFM). The ACFM con-
sists of representatives from the Member States, under the chairmanship of a 
Commission representative. The ACFM delivers its opinion of the draft based 
on the majority laid down in 148(2) of the Treaty. The legislation is imple-
mented by the Commission in case the ACFM accepts the proposed technical 
measures. However, if the ACFM is not in favour of the proposal, the Council 
still has the competence to implement the proposal based on majority voting. 
Moreover, the Member States have the competence to implement supplement-
ing technical measures provided that these measures apply solely to the national  
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fishermen, who in practice apply for local stocks that are of interest solely to 
them. 
 
Table 4.  Technical Measures  
Technical rule for the determination of twine thickness 
Technical rules for the determination of mesh size 
rules for sampling 
lists and technical descriptions of devices that may be attached 
to nets 
technical rues for measuring engine power 
technical rules relating square-meshed netting 
technical rules relating to netting materials 
amendments to rules for the use of mesh size combinations 
Source: Article 48 of 850/98 
 
Finally, the conservation policy as stated in 3760/92 is in force for a ten-year 
period. This implies that by December 31, 2001, the Commission shall present 
the Council with a report that describes the situation in the fisheries involving 
the size of the stocks and expected development, and the economic and social 
development of the coastal regions, and the implementation of the conservation 
policy. By January 31, 2002, the Council must decide on the adjustment of the 
conservation policy, which particularly shall imply a regulation to follow the 
12-mile zone of the Member States, and the management of the fisheries in the 
Shetland box. The decision procedure of Council based, on the report presented 
by the Commission, is based on majority voting as stated in Article 43 of the 
Treaty. 
 
3.2.1.  Evaluation of the Conservation Policy 
An important element in the EU legislation to impact the common fisheries is 
that the conservation policy transfers the competence to make decisions on the 
conservation regulation from the Member States to the Council. This means that 
decisions in the conservation policy are made in the Council based on qualified  
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majority voting, which has the implication that it prevents the Member States 
from vetoing, which could hinder significant agreements on conservation meas-
ures. In this sense the decision making in the EU deviates significantly from the 
procedure used in previous institutional arrangements e.g. the NEAFC
40. Here 
the experience is that countries under an unanimity decision regime are reluc-
tant to impose an effective conservationist regulation, because each country has 
the right to veto thus blocking any progress in a conservationist view (Driscoll 
and McKellar, 1979). By giving up the competence the Member States have 
taken one step towards the sustainable fisheries in the common fisheries. 
 
The relative stability is another important instrument in the EU to solve the con-
flict of sharing the common resources, which is accomplished by giving each 
Member State "the right" to a certain share of the EU catches in the current 
year. Moreover, if all fishermen in the Member States followed the boundary on 
catches and recommended quotas, there would be no problem of excess deple-
tion of the resources in EU waters. However, it is emphasised that the relative 
stability is based on a political compromise, and each Member State and its 
fishermen are interested in increasing their share of the quotas. Thus the sharing 
of the common resource can be seen as a fixed sum game, where the aim of 
each participant is to get the largest piece of the resource (Friedman, 1986; 
Rasmussen, 1995). This is e.g. seen directly in regulation 685/95, which is basi-
cally founded on the fact that Ireland wants to protect its fishing interest, by the 
entry of Portugal and Spain, where notably the latter nation has a large catching 
potential, by employed the largest fishing fleet in the EU. The Irish Government 
wants to obstruct an overwhelming access of Spanish fishing vessels, which 
would deplete the resources. It is the intention to safeguard this by implement-
ing effort management. 
 
An example that shows that the consensus of the relative stability is vulnerable, 
is the so-called quota hopping. The basis of the relative stability is to secure 
each Member State a relative share of the quotas in the EU, which implies that 
the quota of a Member State is reserved to the vessel flying the flag of the 
Member State. The problem encountered from the quota hopping is that fisher-
                                                                 
40  NEAFC stands for the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission.  
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men from one Member State buy a vessel in another Member State, and thereby 
get access to the quotas of that state. In general, the experience is that the 
Member States are not very fond of the quota hopping arrangements. The rea-
son for this is that “foreign” fishermen often place their landings and thereby 
the value added of the catches in the “foreign” Member State. I.e. the Member 
State loses potential economic revenue that could have benefited the local fish-
ing regions. The general consequence of quota hopping is that fishermen have 
bridged the boundary of nationality implicitly laid down in the relative stability, 
and in this sense quota hopping gets an element in the conflict of sharing the 
resources between the Member States. 
 
A direct consequence of quota hopping is seen in the fisheries of the United 
Kingdom, where 95 fishing vessel with Spanish ownership and crew were oper-
ating under the UK flag, and hence utilising the British quotas in the EU. The 
reaction of the United Kingdom was to challenge quota hopping by adopting a 
national legislation that should prevent fishermen from other Member States 
from utilising British quotas. The British Government adopted the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1988 (the Shipping Act), which created the fundament for the es-
tablishment of a new register of vessels. This act restricts the access of foreign 
fishermen to fly the British flag. This was accomplished in the Shipping Act by 
demanding that 75% of the vessel owners, and 75% of the crew members, must 
be British citizens or have permanent residence in United Kingdom for the ves-
sel to enter the register and fly the British flag. The direct consequence of the 
Shipping Act was that Factortame Ltd. and other companies sued the United 
Kingdom for the implementation of the legislation that was discriminatory t o-
wards nationality. The trial proceeded at the High Court of Justice of England 
and Wales, and a preliminary ruling at the European Court of Justice was re-
quested. 
 
The European Court of Justice said that the British legislation contradicted the 
intentions of the  Community legislation
41. The Court judgement stated that al-
though the United Kingdom has the competence to lay down conditions for ves-
sels to be registered under the British flag, the applied conditions have be to  
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compatible with Community legislation. The premise for the decision was that 
the United Kingdom had been violating the freedom of establishment, as stated 
in Article 52 of the Rome Treaty, and the freedom of participation in the capital 
in firms of the Member States stated in Article 221 of the Treaty. 
 
The general conclusion when evaluating the conservation policy is that resource 
sharing is determined by a political compromise that secures sustainable fisher-
ies by implementing instruments  inter alia as the use of the relative stability 
and protected areas. That is, instruments building on the exclusiveness in the 
fisheries, which for the relative stability is applied by the fishing right to quotas, 
and in the case of protected areas, the exclusiveness is used in terms of fishing 
areas. On the other hand, the general intention in EU legislation is based on the 
principles of no discrimination on grounds of nationality. In this sense the prob-
lem in the conservation policy is that it is inconsistent with the general intention 
of free competition in the  common market. The conflict between intentions of 
exclusiveness and equal access is seen in the quota hopping trial, where there is 
a weighting of the Member States’ right to impose exclusiveness versus the aim 
of free competition in the market. This is also expressed in Karagiannakos’ 
(1995, 122) comment to the judgement on the quota hopping trial, 
 
‘the ruling of July 1991 testifies that the principles of freedom of establish-
ment is superior to “relative stability”, on which the whole structure of the 
quota system is based and which have been accepted by all Member States. 
Therefore, as the E.C. moves towards a single market, the national quota 
system seems not only to lose its effectiveness as conservation measure but 
also becomes somewhat incompatible with Community Law’. 
 
However, in general it is difficult to see how the classical problem of the com-
mon fisheries should be managed in the EU without implying the use of exclu-
siveness. The present conservation policy is running to the end of 2002, and by 
then a general revision of the conservation policy shall be implemented, which 
will show how the weighting between the equal access and the exclusiveness 
will be implemented. 
                                                                 
41  European Court Reports 1991 pp. I-3905.  
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3.3.  The Structural Policy 
The general outlines of goal and means for the structural funds are based on 
2052/88
42 and 4253/88
43, which describe the overall task of the structural fund-
ing and secure co-ordination of their activities with the operating of the Euro-
pean Investment Bank and other existing financial instruments. The structural 
funding stated in 2052/88 is applicable for fisheries with respect to the realisa-
tion of two goals. First the funding after the goal 1 criteria, which provides eco-
nomic support to under-developed regions in the EU with a GNP of less than 
75% of the average GNP in the EU. Second, financial support is provided for 
agricultural and fisheries regions according to the goal 5 criteria, which sup-
ports the adjustment and development of the agricultural and fisheries regions 
(based on so-called 5a and 5b goals). 
 
The detailed objectives and implementing of the structural funding for the fish-
eries are outlined in 2080/93
44, which defines the intentions of the structural 
policy of the fishery under two main headlines. First, it is intended with refer-
ence to Article 39 of the Treaty, to safe the economic development and eco-
nomic standard of living for the population in the fishing communities, and to 
increase the supply of fish to the market aimed at increasing the productivity in 
the sector. The intention of economic development also has a social dimension 
based on Article 130A of the Treaty, which states that 
 
‘in particular, the Community shall aim at reducing disparities between the 
levels of development of the various regions and the backwardness of the 
least favoured regions, including rural areas’, 
 
it is therefore defined as a particular goal, to create an economic development in 
the under-developed fishing areas. The second main intention of the structural 
policy is to supplement the conservation policy to obtain a sustainable devel-
opment of the resources, stated in 2080/93 by 
                                                                 
42  O.J. L 185, No. 2052/88, 17.7 1988. 
43  O.J. L 374, No. 4253/88, 31.12 1988. 
44  O.J. L 193, No. 2080/93, 31.7 1993.  
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‘achieving a balance between conservation and the management of re-
sources, on the one hand, and the fishing effort and the stable and rational 
exploitation of those resource, on the other’.
 45 
 
The intentions are mainly realised by the use of financial instruments that is the 
EU is subsidising projects undertaken in the Member States. This implies that 
the intention of economic and social development is achieved e.g. by subsidis-
ing the development of the aquacultural sector, port facilities, etc. On the other 
hand, the intention of balancing the fishing effort with the available resources in 
the EU waters is achieved e.g. by subsidising the scrapping of community ves-
sels, temporary withdrawal of community vessels, or the redeployment of ves-
sels into waters of third countries. This can be done e.g. by joint venture
46 ar-
rangements, which aim to reduce the number of active fishing vessels and 
thereby the fishing effort within EU waters. 
 
The specific criteria and conditions for structural funding of the fisheries are 
laid down in 3699/93
47. In general, the structural policy is operated by use of 
the financial instrument (FIFG), where the Council has the overall competence 
to define the appropriate objectives of the FIFG interventions, and to implement 
rules to realise these objectives. The responsibility of the Member States is to 
manage the structural funding within the limits as defined by the Council. The 
Member States’ mean to get EU funding for fishery is based on submitting sec-
tor plans and aid applications to the Commission, which evaluates the sector 
plans and work out EU programmes for structural funding of the Member 
States. A summary of the applied financial instruments is presented in Table 5. 
                                                                 
45  O.J. L 389, No. 3760/92, 31.12 1992. 
46  The establishment of joint enterprises where EU vessels are transferred to fisheries in the zones 
of third countries, is supported financially. 
47  O.J. L 346, No. 3699/93, 31.12. 1993.  
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Table 5.  Applied instruments to the restructuring of the Fishing Fleet in the 















This includes grants to: i) scrapping vessels, ii) definite transfer 
of vessels to third country or iii) definitive assignment of vessels 





This includes grants to: i) laying up vessels or ii) redeployment 
of the fishing vessel. The premium for laying up is defined as the 
number of days the vessel is taken out of the fisheries, whereas 
redeployment means that the vessel is transferred temporarily to 
a third country’s fishing zone. 
  Con-
struction 





Grants to modernisation of existing vessels are provided. 
  Joint 
venture 
Financial support is provided for the establishment of joint ven-





Grants to fishing operations with a view of assessing profitability 
in long-term exploitation of fishery resources. 
  Mixed 
compa-
nies 
Financial support is given to the establishment of mixed compa-
nies where EU vessels are permanently transferred from fisheries 
in EU waters to fisheries in zones of third Countries. 
Aqua-
culture 
  This includes grants for development of the aquacultural sector 
e.g. by construction and modernisation of aquacultural produc-
tion facilities. 
Other    This includes grants for processing and marketing fishery and 
aquacultural products; grants for fishing port facilities; grants 
protection and development of marine resources in coastal wa-
ters, in particular by the installation of fixed or movable facilities 
to enclose protected underwater area; grants for promotion and 
find new markets outlets for fishery and aquacultural products. 
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One of the EU’s main instruments when balancing the fish resource with the 
fishing effort is to use the instrument of Multi Annual Guidance Programmes 
(MAGP), and thereby control the restructuring of the fishing fleet in each 
Member State. In general the MAGP is defined in Article 5(1) to 3699/93 as 
being 
 
‘a series of objectives accompanied by a set of measures for their realisati-
on, allowing for management of fishing effort on a consistent, longer termed 
basis’. 
 
In practice, the Commission works out the detailed MAGP for the fleet seg-
ments in each Member State, based on the general outlines of the Council. The 
single Member State has the responsibility to manage the MAGP, which in-
volves a task of detail reporting on a monthly basis to the Commission, based 
on the information (summarised in Table 6 – see 109/94 amended by 493/96)
48. 
Additionally, each year by April each Member State must submit an annual re-
port on the development of the MAGP to the Commission. Finally, the Member 
States have to supply computerised databases with information of registered 
fishing vessels, which can be used by the Commission in management of fish-
ing effort. 
 
Table 6.  The Member States’ Reports on the MAGP to the Commission  
Information reported monthly 
specify the gear category for each vessel 
the GT-capacity and fishing effort in terms of GT-days 
for each vessel 
the kW effect of engine and fishing effort in kW-days 
for each vessel 
the general changes in the capacity according to con-
struction of vessels, decommission, modernisation and 
changes in fishing activity of vessels 
Source: Articles 4 and 5 of 109/94 (O.J. L 19, 22.1 1994); Commission regulation 
(O.J. L 72, 493/96, 21.3 1996) 
 
                                                                 
48  O.J. L 19, No. 109/94 , 22.1 1994 and O.J. L 72, No. 493/96, 21.3 1996.  
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If a Member State has not fulfilled its obligation to follow the prescribed 
MAGP, e.g. by not reducing the fishing capacity, the Commission can retain the 
grants for construction and modernisation of the fishing fleet, stated in Article 
10 of 3699/93. On the other hand, if the Member State has been able to reduce 
the capacity in a fleet segment more than demanded by the MAGP, it does not 
allow the Member State to increase the capacity in this segment. The reason is 
that the intention of the structural policy shall supplement the conservation pol-
icy in achieving a sustainable fishery. In order to accommodate this intention, 
harmonised definitions of the capacity of the fishing vessels are also applied. 
They make it easy to monitor and prevent a superfluous increase in the fleet ca-
pacity. In general the harmonised definitions are applied in terms of a standard-
ised measure of GT of the fishing vessels (see 3259/94)
49 and a measure of the 
vessels’ engine power in terms of kilo Watts (kW). However, given that there 
has been some difficulties in applying the harmonised measures in all Member 
States, it has been necessary for the Commission to allow an approximately 
measure of GT in certain Member States (97/259)
50. 
 
Along with the purpose to safeguard a sustainable fishery, limits are set up for 
Member States’ state aid, e.g. for purposes of construction or modernisation of 
fishing vessels. The limitations on state aid has the implication in the common 
fisheries, to prevent the Member States’ from applying for national aid, which 
results in a superfluous increase in the fishing capacity. As stated in Article 
16(2) of 3699/93, the state aid is allowed as long as it does not intervene with 
the Articles 92, 93 and 94 of the Treaty, which prohibit state aid that distorts the 
competition e.g. by benefiting certain firms or productions as long as it affects 
the trade between the Member States. However, there are some exceptions, 
which based on socio-economic objectives allow the use of state aid to promote 
economic development in 
 
‘areas where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is se-
rious underemployment’ or to ‘facilitate the development of certain econo-
mic activities or of certain economic areas’. 
                                                                 
49  O.J. L 339, No. 3259/94, 29.12 1994. 
50  O.J. L 104, No. 259/97, 22.4 1997.  
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Moreover, if the Commission finds that an introduced state aid is not in accor-
dance with the intention of undistorted competition, the Commission suggests 
that the Member State cancels or changes the state aid. If the Member State re-
fuses, the Commission brings the case for the Council of Justice. 
 
In the fishery the limitations on state aid are expressed more specifically in 
C100/97
51, where it is stated that financial advantage funded by the national au-
thorities should be prevented along with 
 
‘capital transfers, reduced-interest loans, interest subsidies, certain State 
holdings in the capital of undertakings, aid financed by special levies and 
aid granted in form of State securities against bank loans or the reduction 
of or exemption from changes or taxes, including accelerated depreciation 
and the reduction of social contributions’. 
 
In addition to this 3699/93 (Annex IV) presents some limits for the maximum 
subsidy with respect to purpose with regard to construction and modernisation. 
Moreover, it is stated that Member States are obliged not to increase the fishing 
effort (Article 7(2) of 3966/93), and hence follow the intention of the sustain-
able utilisation of the resources. Finally, in order to prevent that the Member 
States use unintended state aid, the Commission can ask the Member States to 
outline reports on the individual state aid undertaken, thus assuring that the aid 
has been granted in accordance with intentions in the EU rules (see also 
97/c100/05). 
3.3.1.  Evaluation of the Structural Policy 
In general, the Council has the competence to outline the objectives and means 
in the structural policy; e.g. this is effectuated by the use of the MAGP, where 
the Council imposes restrictions on the adjustment of the fishing capacity in the 
Member States. However, one of the main shortcomings in the structural policy 
to successfully reduce the Member States’ rivalry over the resources, is that the 
structural policy is founded on mutually conflicting objectives. The reason for 
                                                                 
51  O.J. C 100, 97/c 100/05, 27.3 1997.  
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this is based on the historical development of the structural policy. That is, until 
1983
52, the structural policy mainly aimed at securing the economic standard of 
living in the fisheries regions based on a social/community paradigm. However, 
after 1983
53 the structural policy is supplemented with the objective to secure a 
sustainable exploitation of the resources, which follow the conservation and ra-
tionalisation paradigms. The inherent conflict in the structural policy is that it is 
difficult to apply instruments to push to the development of economic growth 
on the one side (vessel construction, etc.) and apply instruments intending to 
secure sustainable resource exploitation on the other (e.g. decommissioning 
schemes). The Commission’s proposal in 1993, to completely cancel EU subsi-
dies for vessel construction, can be seen as the Commission’s attempt to reduce 
the inherent inconsistency between the different objectives in the structural pol-
icy. However, the Member States were not in favour of eliminating the oppor-
tunity to get EU grants for their construction of vessels, and they did not accept 
the cancellation in the Council (Hatcher, 1998). 
 
One of the important elements to secure a sustainable fishery, as intended in the 
Common Fishery Policy, is to co-ordinate the structural and conservation poli-
cies. The application of the MAGP is an important instrument of the structural 
policy, to secure the co-ordination, and thereby to achieve the balancing of the 
fishing effort and the resource abundance. However, in practice there are poten-
tial difficulties when applying the MAGP to obtain the sustainable fishery. First 
of all, what is intended by the MAGP is to reduce the fishing effort with the 
purpose to reduce the catch of fish (fishing mortality). Scientifically, however, 
it has been difficult to establish the relationship between fishing effort and fish-
ing mortality, an attempt is the study by Frost et al. (1995), where the impact of 
the decommissioning schemes on fishing mortality is analysed. In general, the 
study does not show any significant empirical relationship between the fishing 
effort and the fish mortality, when estimated at fleet level. A possible reason is 
that there is excess capacity in the fisheries, which implies that the reduction in 
fleet capacity is insufficient to decrease the fishing mortality
54. In this sense the 
                                                                 
52  Cf. regulation 2141/70; 101/76. 
53  Cf. regulation 2908/83; 4028/86; 3699/93. 
54  Statement based on communication with Hans Frost (one of the authors).  
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problem by implementing the MAGP is that it is difficult to apply psychical 
limitations on GT or kW fishing days that will actually impact the required re-
duction of the fishing mortality. A second difficulty in applying the MAGP, to 
reduce the fishing effort is that there is an ongoing technological development 
of the fishing vessels, where e.g. Roy and Gates (1991) estimate the technologi-
cal progress to be 1.5%, and the Commission anticipates an increase in the 
technological progress of 2%
55. However, the different estimates of productivity 
make it difficult to set fix-points targets for fishing capacity, as applied in the 
MAGP, and to secure a balancing of the fishing effort and the abundance of re-
source. Third, the application of the MAGP assumes that it is possible to man-
age the fishing effort, but in general fishing effort comprises a range of different 
items such as vessel tonnage, engine power, number of fishing days, crew size, 
etc. Moreover, there is a range of substitution possibilities between the different 
components of production factors, which the regulator has to predict in order to 
control effective fishing effort. This is e.g. seen in the study by Dupont (1991), 
in which she shows that it is more effective to reduce fishing effort by limiting 
the number of fishing days than by limiting the tonnage of the vessel. The rea-
son is that it is easier for the fishermen to compensate a restriction of tonnage 
by changing the inputs of gear, crew or fuel, than to compensate a restriction of 
fishing days. That is, in the Canadian pacific salmon fishery, the regulator 
should aim at reducing the number of fishing days, if the objective is to reduce 
the fishing effort. In general, the results of Dupont (1991) are relevant, because 
they show that the impact of the restrictions implemented by the MAGP depend 
on the relative substitution possibility between the variable inputs and the elas-
ticity of intensity between the fixed input and variable inputs. Therefore, to 
work out a proper MAGP, the Commission has to take account of these elastic-
ities, and as there is no reason to believe that the elasticities are equal for all 
vessels segments, it is necessary for the Commission to undertake estimation of 
the elasticities for each vessel segment, individually. 
 
As outlined earlier, the Commission in 1993 proposed the cancellation of the 
EU’s funding for vessel construction, this is seen as a necessary step in order to 
                                                                 
55  Structural Policy to Assist Fisheries and Aquaculture. European Commission, October 1995. 
XIV/464/95-EN.  
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change the incentives of the fishermen in a common fisheries in EU  waters. 
However, the cancellation of the funding for vessel construction is in itself not 
sufficient to prevent the development of over-capacity in the fisheries. There-
fore, the structural policy could be supplemented by setting barriers that prevent 
the M ember States from giving national subsidies to increase the capacity of 
their respective fishing fleets. In the guidelines for state aid in the fisheries, it is 
intended that 
 
‘in more practical terms, aid must provide incentives for development and 
adaptation which cannot be undertaken under normal market circumstances 
because of insufficient flexibility in the sector and the limited financial ca-
pacity of chose employed in it. It must yield lasting improvement so that the 
industry can continue to develop solely on the basis of market earnings. Its 




In general, the formulation of these intentions in the EU legislation is based on 
the premise that it is necessary to subsidise e.g. increases in the fishing capacity 
in order to secure the sufficient production in the sector. However, in general 
the EU has to take account of the inherent (resource) conflict between the 
Member States, and it is therefore necessary that the EU prevents subsidies 
from either the EU or national funds from being used in an internal race over 
the resource between the Member States. In this sense it should be recognised 
that an unequal development in the fishing capacity of the Member States could 
be the first step to claim a revised sharing of the resources in the EU, and 
thereby undermine the consensus as founded by the relative stability. The fish-
ermen’s pressure to achieve more funding from the Governments in the Mem-
ber can e.g. be seen in the Meuriot (1985, 1986) study of the French fisheries, 
where the politicians instead of rationalising the fleet engaged in subsidising the 
fleet in order to prevent mass unemployment. Moreover, there have been a 
range of trials at the European of Court of Justice (see e.g. the cases, T-68/96, 
                                                                 
56  O.J. C 100, 97/c 100/05, 27.3 1997.  
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C-200/94, C-55/90)
57, where fishermen claim increased EU funding, which in-
dicates the fishermen’s eager for funding. In the base situation, the access to 
funding is a natural weighting of the political objectives of economic develop-
ment versus sustainable fisheries. 
 
However, leaving the more principal discussions of the structural policy, and 
going into a more detailed monitoring of the results of the structural policy. We 
focus on how the actual EC grants have been used, and how they have affected 
the development in the fleet capacity of the Member States. A summary of the 
relative distribution of the EU’s subsidies between 1986 and 1993 is outlined in 
Table 7. In general, 60% (1,112 mill ECU) of the EU’s structural funding of the 
fisheries, is used for purposes of the fishing fleet, 15% (286 mill ECU) is used 
for the modernisation and development of the aquacultural sector, and the re-
maining 25% (507 mill ECU) is used for other purposes, i.e. mainly for proc-
essing/marketing of fish products and a small share is given to investments in 
port facilities. 
                                                                 
57  Case T 68/96 European Court reports 198, II-153; Case C-200/European Court reports 1995, II-
3709; Case C-55/90, European Court reports 1992, I-2553.  
56 
Table 7.  Cumulative Structural Subsidies to the Member States Fishing Sec-












































B  0.0  47.8  3.3  8.5  0.0  0.8  39.6  100.0  19.22 
D  11.4  40.3  14.4  4.6  0.5  5.4  23.3  100.0  97.45 
DK  0.0  62.7  1.6  5.4  3.6  6.7  19.9  100.0  123.50 
E  7.0  26.0  15.1  8.3  13.6  11.5  18.5  100.0  531.92 
F  0.7  12.8  20.7  4.8  8.0  16.1  37.0  100.0  193.00 
GR  0.1  32.1  6.1  2.6  10.8  31.4  16.8  100.0  173.20 
I  4.6  14.1  10.6  13.7  11.0  20.5  25.5  100.0  292.35 
IRL  0.0  5.6  3.4  17.4  2.0  22.6  49.0  100.0  71.96 
NL  0.0  69.3  0.0  2.1  1.6  9.3  17.7  100.0  58.47 
P  1.4  23.3  16.4  2.6  11.0  10.0  35.2  100.0  250.08 
UK  0.0  8.0  10.9  12.4  0.7  21.3  46.8  100.0  96.27 
                   
EUR12  3.5  26.0  12.2  7.5  9.2   15.1  26.6  100.0  1907.42 
Source: Structural Policy to Assist Fisheries and aquaculture. European Commission, 
October 1995. XIV/464/95-EN 
1  Includes: joint ventures, small-scale fishing, experimental fishing and rede-
ployment operation. 
2  Construction, modernisation and extension. 
3  Artificial reefs, port facilities, processing/marketing, prospecting for new 
markets, specific measures and guarantee fund. 
 
In essence, the difference in the EU funding of the single Member State is 
based on differences in the intended policies of the national governments, and 
their willingness to supply the national share of the funding that is required to 
receive EU funding, and the willingness of the national government to submit 
aid applications to the EU. The figures in Table 7 represent the accommodated 
restructuring policies in the single Member States. Belgium (B), the Nether-
lands (NL) and Ireland (IRL) have followed a strategy that applies for a rela-
tively modest EU funding of the national fishing sectors, whereas Spain (E), 
Italy (I), and Portugal (P) have followed a more ambitious path by using sig-
nificant EU funds in the restructuring of the fishing sector, which is mainly  
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based on the goal 1 funding that supports regions which a GNP of is less than 
75% of the average in the EU. In Denmark (DK) and the Netherlands (NL) the 
grants have primarily been used to implement a strategy of permanently with-
drawing vessels from the national fishing fleet, whereas France (F) and Italy (I) 
have followed a strategy of funding modernisation and construction of vessels, 
which would actually increase the fishing capacity in these Member States. 
 
The Member States’ trade off between the intention of economic development 
and the intention to secure a sustainable fishery with respect to the fishing fleet 
is indicated in Figure 4. That is, to what extent have the Member States applied 
for EU funding with the purpose to increase or decrease the nominal fleet ca-
pacity. The 45￿ line in Figure 4 shows the equilibrium where sum of subsidies 
for construction plus modernisation of vessels are equal to subsidies permanent 
withdrawal of vessels. 
 
Figure 4. Relative Grants for Construction, Modernisation/Permanent With-
drawal Received by the Member States between 1986-1993 due to 
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The Member States placed on t he left-hand side of the 45° receive the most 
subsidies for permanent withdrawal. It is noted that Spain (E), Portugal (P), and 
Italy (I) have in absolute terms received the majority of the subsidies for re-
structuring, whereas Italy (I) and France (F) have received considerable 
amounts for construction and modernisation. On the other hand, Denmark 
(DK), the Netherlands (NL) and Greece (GR) have followed the objective to 
reduce the fishing capacity in the fleet. 
 
An alternative way to analyse the development in the capacity of the fishing 
fleet in the Member States is to look directly at the achievements of the MAGP 
plan. A summary of the average realisation of goals between 1991 and 1996 is 
presented in Table 8. In general MAGP between 1991-1996, has been success-
ful in obtaining to reduce the over-capacity in the EC fishing fleet in the sense 
that fleet capacity has been reduced with 300,000 GRT and 790,000 kW, that is 
by 15% and 9.5%, respectively. The total capacity of the EC was 11% under the 
objective with respect to GRT and 5% under the objective of kW. 
 
Table 8.  The Member States’ Goal Performance with Respect to the MAGP, 
1991-1996  
Country  % Global situation/global goal  No. of segments for which the goals 
were fulfilled/total no. of segments 
  GRT  KW  GRT  KW 
B  96  94  ½  ½ 
D  79  87  8/9  9/9 
DK  77  81  5/5  5/5 
E  76  85  5/5  5/5 
F  99  104  4/6  2/6 
GR  96  100  2/3  2/3 
I*  (98)  (104)  NA  NA 
IRL  94  99  2/3  2/3 
NL  148  109  0/3  0/3 
P  64  76  9/9  9/9 
S  97  97  3/5  5/5 
SF  96  98  6/6  5/6 
UK  104  102  4/10  6/10 
* based on the report’s data submitted by Italy 
Source: Com (97) 352 Final, 11.7 1997  
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In general, the majority of the Member States have been able to follow the 
goals of the MAGP, which is seen in the first two columns of Table 8, where 
only the Netherlands and United Kingdom are not yet ready to meet the obliga-
tions of the total fleet with respect to GRT and kW. On the other hand, the two 
colons to the right show that only Denmark, Portugal and Spain meet the re-
quirements of GRT and kW for all fleet segments. That is, although the total 
reduction in the fleet capacity has been achieved, there is still a need for reduc-
tions in the majority of vessel segments in the Member States. The EU’s to re-
action to the Member States not in compliance with the goals in the MAGP is to 
withhold subsidies for construction and modernisation of vessels. 
 
In general, the structural policy is designed to take account of two mutually 
conflicting objectives, that is, on the one hand securing economic development 
of the fishing fleet and on the other to securing a sustainable fisheries by pulling 
vessels out from the fisheries in the EU waters. The underlying problem in re-
ducing the rivalry of the resources is that the structural policy should be de-
signed to prevent the Member States from finding themselves in a non-
cooperative n-player game (Ruseski, 1998). The aim of the individual Member 
State is to increase its individual share of EU resources, by using the structural 
grants to increase their fishing capacity and obtain a favourable position in the 
political negotiations over the EU resource. One of the important instruments, 
to prevent this armament of the Member States’ fishing capacity, is to imple-
ment effective barriers that e.g. forbid national subsidies, which increase the 
fishing effort. This example includes direct subsides of the fishing effort (e.g. 
for modernisation and construction of vessels) and indirect subsidies in form of 
interest subsidies, favourable depreciation, tax legislation, etc. Therefore, in the 
managing of the structural policy, the EU has to take account of the inherent 
(resource) conflict and the welfare loss that will result from an internal race in 
fishing effort between the Member States. It is therefore necessary to prevent 
subsidies from either EU or national funds to be used in a strategic game be-
tween the Member States. This could e.g. be hindered by restricting the access 
to national subsidising in the rules of the structural policy, and give the Com-
mission instruments to handle inadequate national subsidising in the Member 
States.  
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3.4.  The Control Policy 
In order to prevent the rivalry of the common resource in the EU it is important 
that the control regulation defines the means that secure a reliable enforcement 
and imposes penalties that are deterring, in sense of obtaining compliance with 
the regulation. The control regulation covers all aspects of the Common Fishery 
Policy including elements in the overall conservation, structural and market 
regulations. 
 
The control regulation, stated in 2847/93
58 and later amendments, lay down the 
general guidelines for regulation and place the competence to monitor the na-
tional authorities with the Member States. An important principle in the control 
regulation is to prevent that actions of enforcement differ significantly between 
the Member States. That is, inequality in the application of control from one 
Member State to another may cause the fishermen to feel unfairly treated and 
moreover dissuasive sanctions that reduce the effectiveness of controls should 
be prevented. In addition, it is intended that the Member States 
 
‘should take all the necessary non-discriminatory measures to guard 
against and prosecute irregularities, particularly by establishing a roster of 
sanctions which effectively deprive the wrong-doers of the commercial gain 
resulting form their infringements’. 
 
In this sense the control regulation is seen to have a significant role to play, 
aiming to secure the necessary compliance and hence the objectives in the 
Common Fishery Policy. 
 
The specific objectives, as stated in 2847/93, are that the control regulation is 
based on monitoring 
 
‘the management of fishery resources, which is based in particular on total 
allowable catches (TAC) and quotas and technical measures, is to be sup-
                                                                 
58  O.J. L 261, 20.10 1993.  
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plemented by management of the fishing effort, which involves monitoring 
fishing activities and capacities’. 
 
In general, the competence to undertake monitoring and inspection of the fish-
ing vessels and landing ports is placed with the Member States, which have the 
responsibility to undertake the necessary arrangements. This, as stated in Arti-
cle 1 to 2847/93, implies that the Member State 
 
‘shall place sufficient means at the disposal of its competent authorities to 
enable them to perform their tasks of inspection and control’. 
 
The role of the Commission on the other hand is to ensure that the Member 
States monitor and prevent infringements in an equitable manner. This is 
achieved, first by the establishment of a force of EU-inspectors that carry out 
necessary verification of the Member States’ application of the control regula-
tion. This means that representatives from the Commission, along with the na-
tional authorities, establish a mutually acceptable inspection programme, where 
representatives from the Commission make on-the-spot visits and are present at 
the national authorities’ current control of the fisheries. In addition, the Member 
States shall secure that the EU-inspectors have on-the-spot access to available 
information, which is specified in databases. Based on these on-the-spot visits, 
the EU-inspectors work out evaluation reports and if appropriate, recommend 
control measures that can improve the application of the control in the Member 
States. If the EU-inspectors find that the applied control arrangement is not ef-
fective, they inform the Member State, which will then conduct an administra-
tive inquiry (if necessary with representatives from the Commission present). 
 
According to the control regulation, Member States have the obligation within 
the area of their sovereignty or jurisdiction, to monitor the fishing activities of 
both EU and non-EU vessels. Moreover, the single Member State is responsible 
of monitoring the vessels flying the Member State’s flag within the waters of 
third countries. In general, the Member States are responsible of inspecting the 
operating vessels at sea including activities with regard to landing, sale, trans- 
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port, storage of fish, etc. A summary of the variety in the assignment of the na-
tional inspectors according to the control regulation is outlined in Table 9. 
 
Table 9.  Elements That the Member States Have to Control According to 
the Common Fisheries Policy (2347/93)  




the fishing vessels and all activities of catch, including information on 
gear used and catch of species, including catch quantity, weight, size 
and catching area. 




2  in the following areas: 
i)  restructuring, renewal and modernisation of the fishing fleet; 
ii) adaptation of fishing capacity by means of temporary or definitive 
cessation; 
iii) restriction of the activity of certain vessels; 
iv) restriction of the design and numbers of fishing gear and of the 
method in which it is used; 
v) development of the aquaculture and coastal areas. 
Market
3  technical aspects of applying: 
i)  the marketing standards, and in particular minimum sizes; 
ii) the price arrangements, in particular; 
withdrawal of products form markets for purposes other than human 
consumption; 
storage and/or processing of products withdrawn from the market. 
1)  Article 2 (2847/93) 
2)  Article 24 in 2847/93 
3)  Article 28 in 2847/93 
4)  The Irish Box is the area, South of latitude 56￿30; North east of longitude 
12￿ West and North of latitude 50￿30, North. O.J. L301 2870/95, 14/12 1995 
 
In practise, the national inspection is mainly focused on the fishing activities of 
the operating vessels off sea and on the inspection of the landings in the port. 
The inspections imply that both the master of the fishing vessels and the fishing  
63 
auctions bring forward detailed information on the catch of different species, 
based on the principles listed in Table 10. 
 
Table 10. Elements that should be reported to the competent National Autho-
rities  
Reported by  Information to be reported  
The masters of 
fishing vessels
1) 
- shall keep a logbook
a) of their operations, indicating the quanti-
ties of each species caught and kept on board, the date and loca-
tion (ICES statistical rectangle) of such catches and the type of 
gear used 
- shall within 48 hours of landing submit a declaration (containing 
information on quantities of landings distributed on species and 
catch area) to the competent authorities of the Member State 
where the landing takes place 
Auctions or bod-
ies responsible 
for the first mar-
keting 
2) 
shall submit a sales note that contain information on: 
- for all species, where appropriate, the individual size and weight, 
grade presentation and freshness 
- the price and quantity at first sale for each species, and, where 
appropriate, on an individual size or weight, presentation and 
freshness basis. 
- where appropriate, the destination of products withdrawn from 
the market (by products, human consumption, carry-over) 
- the name of the seller and the buyer 
- the place and the date of the sale 
- the external identification and the name of the fishing vessels 
which landed the products 
- the name of the vessel’s owner or the master 
  - the port and date of landing 
1)  Article 6, 8 (2847/93) 
2)  Article 9 (2847/93) 
a)  Fishing vessels less than 10 metres are released from the obligation to keep 
logbook 
 
The crosschecking of the logbook data and sales notes has traditionally played 
the main role of the inspectors’ monitoring of the fishing activities. However, in 
the later years the traditional instruments have been supplemented with the pos- 
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sibility of satellite monitoring. The principles of the satellite-based vessels 
monitoring system, called VMS, is that it shall enable a fishing vessel to com-
municate its geographical position by satellite to the flag and the coastal Mem-
ber States
59. In general, the VMS by the 30 June 1998 shall be applied on all EU 
vessels exceeding 20 metres between perpendiculars or 24 metres overall 
length
60. The Member States are obliged on establish fisheries monitoring cen-
tres, which are responsible for the use of the VMS on the fishing vessels flying 
the Member States’ flag regardless of the waters in which they operate, or the 
port they are staying in (EU or third country). In addition, the Member State is 
responsible for the monitoring of the fishing vessels of other Member States as 
long as the vessels operate in the waters under the sovereignty or the jurisdic-
tion of the Member State. 
 
Given that the Member State inspections show that the Common Fishery Policy 
has not been respected, the national authorities shall take the appropriate meas-
ures in form of national administrative actions or criminal proceedings based on 
the national law. The proceedings that are initiated at Member State level shall 
either confiscate the economic gains or use appropriate restrictions, which are 
proportionate to the seriousness of infringements, and in this way effectively 
discourage further offences of the same kind implemented by the sanctions pre-
sented Table 11. 
 
                                                                 
59  O.J. L 102, No. 686/97, 19.4 1997. 
60  Until 1 January 2000 the VMS covers: a) vessels operating in high seas, except in the Mediter-
ranean Sea; b) vessels operating in waters of third countries, provided that provisions have been 
made in agreements with the relevant third country for the application of a VMS to the vessels 
of such a country operating in the waters of the EU; c) vessels catching fish for reduction to 
meal and oil.  
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Table 11. Sanctions implemented as a Result of the Criminal Proceedings 
based on the Offence of the Common Fisheries Policy  
Sanctions 
- fines 
- confiscation of prohibited fishing gear and catches 
- confiscation of the vessel 
- temporary immobilisation of the vessel 
- suspension of the licence 
- withdrawal of the license 
Source: Article 31 in 2847/93 
 
The Member States shall notify the Commission of any laws, regulations or 
administrative provisions adopted by the national authority to prevent and 
prosecute irregularities. Moreover, the Commission shall be notified the results 
of the national inspections or monitoring, and the number and type of infringe-
ment discovered and the action taken. 
 
Moreover, the Member States are obliged periodically to report to the Commis-
sion,  this covers a monthly reporting of the catch on location and quantities 
landed by the Member States’ vessels operating in the EU and third countries’ 
fishing waters. The Commission shall also be informed on the anticipated quota 
consumption forecast indicating the date of exhaustion for species, which have 
reached an exhaustion of 70% of the Member State’s quota. In the general per-
spective, the Member States shall moreover work out a yearly report containing 
information on assessment of the technical and human resources used to apply 
the control function, and measures which may help to alleviate any shortcom-
ings discovered. 
 
Finally, in order to secure a detailed level of knowledge and improve the capa-
bility of the on-the-spot visits of EU-inspectors in the  Member States, the 
Member States are accountable for the establishment of computer readable files 
on the detailed monitoring of the fishing activities, as summarised in Table 12. 




Table 12. The Member States are obliged to register the following Informati-
on of Fishing Activities in a Computer readable Form 
Information to be registered in computer readable form 
- the information from the VMS (Article 3) 
- the logbook information (Article 6) 
- information of the vessel’s landings (Article 8) 
- information of the sales notes (Article 9) 
- logbook and landing information on third countries operating the in 
EU fishing waters (Article 10) 
- all sales notes within the Member State (Article 14) 
- information of the Member State’s fishing activities in the waters of 
third countries (logbooks, landings on transhipment) (Article 17) 
 
3.4.1.  Evaluation of the Control Policy 
At first hand the control regulation seems effective in specifying a range of de-
tailed information requirements of the sector that forms the necessary basis 
which the national authorities can monitor, in order to obtain the objectives in 
the Common fisheries policy. In general it is, however, an important shortcom-
ing that the main responsibility of control is placed at the level of the national 
authorities. The reason for this is that the Member States have conflicting inter-
ests when controlling the vessels flying their own flag, as the imposing of strict 
enforcement on its own vessels would reduce the competitiveness of the n a-
tional vessel compared to vessels in other Member States with a weak control. 
In this sense a strict enforcement policy would in the short run have a negative 
impact on the economic standard of living in the fishery depending areas of the 
Member State. The core problem is that the common resources problem is still 
present in the community’s fisheries, that is, the Member States are technically 
sharing a restricted common resource. Each Member State has incentives to in-
crease catches, which will happen at the expense of the other states in the EU. 
Therefore, each Member State would have incentives to implement a laissez 
faire enforcement policy, which ignores when national fishermen try to increase 
their income by breaking the regulation of e.g. technical measures. With a c-
count to this, the Member State could have simple financial motives aiming at  
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low national costs of enforcement, which would be in accordance with the lais-
sez faire control policy. 
 
The ambiguous interests, the Member States have in controlling their own fish-
ing fleet can for example be seen in the case of the Commission’s trial against 
the French government at the European Court of Justices
61. The position of the 
Commission was that the French government did not meet the responsibility of 
enforcing (at sea as well as on shore) the technical measures in accordance with 
the community regulation stated in 171/83 and 3094/86. The Commission based 
its standpoint of infringement of the Treaty, on reports based on on-the-spot-
visits by the EU-inspectors, which concluded that the French authorities did not 
take the necessary legal or administrative actions, in cases where the legislation 
had been violated. Moreover, the EU-inspectors found that the national authori-
ties did not control the regulation of by-catches and minimum size limits on fish 
in the Bay of Biscay. The position of the French government was that it could 
not reject that there had been irregularities in the control. The French govern-
ment, however, was of the opinion that the on-the-spot visits by the EU-
inspectors could not be used as evidence to conclude in general that the French 
government had been violating the intentions of the Treaty. 
 
The European Court decided that the French government had violated the inten-
tion of the Treaty. The premise for the Court’s decision was based on the EU-
inspectors’ reports that were put forward in the court. The Court reached the 
conclusion that there had been something lacking in the n ational authority’s 
handling of the control function. This means according to writ that the Member 
State that does not meet the responsibility to control breaks the solidarity be-
tween Member States and the equal treatment of the fishermen and hence the 
foundation demanded for, according to the common conservation regulation 
stated in 170/83. In specific, it was concluded that the French authority had vio-
lated its obligation to control the minimum size of meshes, by-catch regulations 
and regulations on minimum size limits on fish. In addition, the French gov-
ernment had neglected to take any administrative or legal sanctions as a conse-
quence of the disregarded regulations.  
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The important implication of the trial is that it underlines the use of EU-
inspectors’ r eports as evidence in the European Court, which strengthens the 
Commission’s position to monitor the Member States’ application of the control 
regulation. In more general terms, the trials on the Member States’ control of 
the fisheries regulation (see also the cases C-244/89, C-258/89) reinforces the 
Commission’s judgement that some countries accomplish  laissez faire e n-
forcement of the control regulation, as stated in the Commission’s report
62 on 
the control in the fisheries. Moreover, it is stated that there are significant dif-
ferences between the Member States: in some states the control is well-
organised and based on inspection of highly skilled human resources, but in 
others it is insufficient or exclusively directed towards ‘foreign’ fishermen. 
Plus, the Commission states, due to the fact that some national authorities fail to 
control the technical restrictions, the fishermen anticipate that the regulations 
only apply for ‘foreign’ fishermen. 
 
One of the main ways to avoid the classical common pool problem would be to 
let the independent EU-inspectors play a more significant role in the control 
regulation. This in fact was the intention in the Commission’s proposal to the 
latest revision of the control regulation as stated by Holden (1996). The Com-
mission  based its proposal on the principle that the EU-inspectors should have 
increased competence e.g. by guaranteeing them the right to intervene without 
prior notice. Further, it was an opening for the definition of the most appropri-
ate levels for inspection t asks, which could open for an increased monitoring 
competence to EU-inspectors. The Commission based its proposition with the 
interpretation that the national authorities might have conflicting interests in the 
application of a strict enforcement policy. Additionally, it is noted that Holden 
(1996, 160) argues that ‘the major political objective (by the Member States in 
the setting of the control policy) has obviously been to avoid transferring any 
effective powers for control, monitoring and enforcement from the Member 
States to the Commission’. Thus he ads that the control policy is the Achilles 
                                                                 
61  Case C-64/88, European Court Reports, 1991, pp. I-2727. 
62  Report on Monitoring Implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy: Commission document 
SEC (92) 394 final.  
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heal in the Common Fishery Policy. This position is also followed by Kara-
giannakos (1995, 249) in his statement on the control policy: 
 
‘an important component necessary to substantiate the monitoring system is 
the determination of national governments. However, the existing fisheries 
management system provides little incentive to fishermen and governments 
to empower a reliable and comprehensive monitoring system for fishing ac-
tivities. Therefore, under the existing CFP a more centralised monitoring 
system is needed which could invest more powers in EU inspectors than the 
national authorities. However, such a system is unlikely to be applied since 
again the fishermen and Member States are not committed to this policy’. 
 
However, leaving the discussion about distribution of the competence to control 
between Member States and the Commission, the success of the applied control 
regulation will also depend on; i) the strictness of enforcement, i.e. the risk of 
being detected; and ii) the level of the penalties (see e.g. Becker (1968), Sutinen 
and Andersen (1985)). In order to get a picture of the Member States’ eagerness 
in the control policy it is essential to go into a more detailed monitoring of the 
Member States’ attitudes. In general, the strictness of enforcement can be tested 
by inspecting the single elements in the Member States’ enforcement, to this 
end a summary of the human and technical resources dedicated to the control 
and enforcement in the Member States is presented in Table 13. 
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Table 13. Summary of Resource Devoted to Control and Enforcement by 







Days at sea 
(D) 
D/V  Aircraft 
B  1  4  48  12  0 
DK  145  7  466  67  0 
F  (a)  8  1041  130  (b)+ 
D  47  11  1065  97  0 
IRL  7  5  921  184  + 
NL  180  12  1346  112  0 
P  12  26  2365  91  (c)2 
E  17  25  252  101  0 
UK  180  21  3190  152  (d)3 
Source: Report on Monitoring Implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy: 
Commission document SEC (92) 394 final 
(a)  Control and enforcement is the responsibility of the Secretariat of State for 
the Sea whose staff carries out a wide range of activities connected with ma-
ritime affairs 
(b)  Approximately 5,000 hours per year 
(c)  Approximately 200 hours per year 
(d)  Dedicated to control and enforcement 
+  Numbers not specified 
 
In general, there are large differences in the human and technical resources that 
the Member States devote to control purposes. It is difficult to compare effort 
engaged in the Member States because the personal in several states has a vari-
ety of different tasks and they are therefore not only devoted to control the fish-
eries but may have other tasks e.g. rescuing purposes. In the land-based moni-
toring, the Netherlands, United Kingdom and Denmark in general devote many 
resources by utilising a number of inspectors in each port, whereas in Spain, 
Ireland and France one inspector is engaged and he monitors several ports. In 
the control at sea, there is a general shortcoming in all Member States so only a 
few resources are devoted to aircraft monitoring, which much be seen as an ef-
fective and powerful monitoring instrument. The emerging of the satellite 
monitoring system generally increases the efficiency of the monitoring at sea, it 
is a cost efficient instrument, one advantage is monitoring with respect to pro-
tected fishing zones, or e.g. the inspection of the effort regulation in the Irish  
71 
Box. However, the satellite monitoring does not solve the problem of misre-
ported landings or the use of small mesh size, or the catch of undersized fish, 
therefore it is still necessary that the Member States continue their inspection of 
the operating fishing vessels and the inspections in the ports. 
 
In general, the Member States performed 20,539 inspections of fishing vessels 
in 1990, the inspectors found offences in 12% of the inspections. A summary of 
the most important offences in the Member States is presented in Table 14. The 
major part of the disregards are found in the neglecting of the technical instru-
ments such as forbidden gear, fisheries in forbidden area, fisheries without a 
license and lack of logbook reporting of catches. At the inspection in the ports 
1,456 disregards were discovered mainly with respect to missing the reporting 
of catches and the catch of undersized fish. In general, out of a total of 3,937 
detected offences at sea/ports, 37% of these resulted in criminal proceedings at 
the national Courts. There are large differences between the number of inspec-
tions and the number of detected offences in the Member States. Portugal, 
France, the Netherlands and Spain have a number of inspections above average, 
whereas it is remarkable that within the large jurisdiction of Irish waters, only 
253 fishing vessels were inspected in 1990. In general, the rate of offences is 
quite high; Spain and Portugal have unusual high rates of respectively 22% and 
15% of the inspected vessels. 
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Table 14. The Offences in the Different Member States Inspected at Sea and 
in the Ports in 1990  
  Country of vessel registration 
  B  D  DK  E  F  IRL  NL  P  UK  OTH 
Total no. of inspected ves-
sels 
644  446  839  2459  2976  253  2902  7349  2285  386 
Total no. of vessels that 
have committed violations 
45  49  50  541  318  17  93  1172  95  13 
At sea:                     
- logbook and or landing 
statement 
14  5  10  73  28  4  16  9  58  0 
- forbidden gear  18  18  12  39  82  1  35  111  13  0 
- fishing banned for the 
following reasons: 
                   
* forbidden area  2  12  9  49  110  0  19  49  4  0 
* too great machine power 
or tonnage 
2  0  5  1  0  0  10  0  5  0 
- illegal catches for the fol-
lowing reasons: 
                   
* direct fishing  3  0  10  2  0  5  2  1  0  0 
* by-catches  0  0  5  4  0  0  0  0  1  0 
* undersized fish  7  5  0  24  50  4  13  10  15  0 
- unlawful fishing  0  2  3  108  1  4  0  227  10  13 
- tagging arrangements  0  2  0  25  19  2  1  387  1  0 
- tagging and identification 
of the vessel  
4  0  4  28  5  2  1  60  3  0 
- other  6  1  9  226  30  2  1  315  19  0 
In port:                     
logbook and or landing 
statement 
27  35  280  64  18  0  529  3  346  4 
- forbidden gear  1  5  5  5  22  0  46  94  5  1 
fishing banned for the fol-
lowing reasons: 
                   
* forbidden area  2  0  6  5  24  0  0  104  0  0 
* too great machine power 
or tonnage 
0  0  0  0  2  0  2  5  0  0 
- illegal catches for the fol-
lowing reasons: 
                   
* direct fishing  1  0  9  0  0  0  99  2  1  0 
* by-catches  1  0  40  11  0  0  0  0  0  0 
* undersized fish  7  18  38  4  113  0  81  22  128  0 
- unlawful fishing  0  6  5  23  0  2  11  69  0  0 
- tagging arrangements  0  1  8  6  54  0  0  6  0  9 
- tagging and identification 
of the vessel 
10  0  0  3  30  0  10  6  0  0 
- other  25  2  0  52  18  0  0  274  0  0 
Source:  Report on Monitoring Implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy: 
Commission document SEC (92) 394 final. 
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In order to take account of the deterrence of the applied enforcement systems, it 
is essential to note that there are also large differences in the sanctions applied 
by the Member States to secure compliance with the fisheries policy. In the 
Netherlands and France 75-92% of the offending vessels are brought to the na-
tional Courts, whereas in Portugal the major part of offences are handled by of-
ficial w arnings and less than 1% of the offences are brought to the national 
Court. In addition to criminal proceedings it important to secure that the sanc-
tions and deterrence are proportional to the seriousness of the offence. A sum-
mary of the implemented maximum fines in the Member States is outlined in 
Table 15. 
 
Table 15. The Size of Fines in the Single Member States in 1990  
Member State  Maximum penalty in ECU  Fines imposed in ECU 
B (a)  75,644  236 to 1,418 
DK (b)  3,167  127 to 30% (b) 
F(a)  716 to 71,642  716 to 71,642 
D  72,963  2,432 to 17,025 
IRL (a)  130,141  50,755 to 171,136 (c) 
NL (a)  10,792  4,317 
P (d)  1,393 to 27,860  1,393 to 27,860 
E  31,397 to 78,493  7,849 to 78,493 
UK (e)  2,867 to 71,679  717 to 64,511 
Source: Holden (1996) 
(a) Gear and catches may be seized for the following offences: 
  unauthorised fishing (no quota) 
  unauthorised fishing (no licence) 
  fishing with unauthorised gear 
  keeping undersized fish on board 
(b) Danish legislation provides for fines to be levied proportionally, up to 30% of the 
market value of the landing to which the offence is related 
(c) Includes value of gear and catches confiscated 
(d) As (a) but immediate seizure of illicit gear when convicted of fishing with unaut-
horised gear. 
(e) As (d) except no provision of seizure of gear when fishing without a licence 
 
In general, it is noted that Ireland by far receives the highest penalties in the 
EU. To this end it should be noted that Ireland also has the lowest effort of in- 
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spection in the EU, and the high penalties decided by the Irish Courts have been 
given to Spanish fishing vessels. According to reports by the Commission, the 
opinion is that the penalties in general are too low in the Member States. In 
general, the penalties are low in the EU, and it should be secured that the penal-
ties should be deterring in the sense that the fine should not be less than the 
economic gain of the infringement. 
 
First of all, the general conclusion is that the control regulation in order to se-
cure compliance with the fisheries regulations, needs a more efficient monitor-
ing, this could be accomplished by increasing the competence and number of 
the EU-inspectors in the EU. However, in order to improve the effectiveness of 
the monitoring, it is necessary to have a close collaboration between the EU-
inspectors and the national inspectors, as national inspectors often have a better 
knowledge of the local conditions in the particular area, which may increase the 
efficiency of the monitoring. In order to reduce the number of offences in the 
fisheries it is essential to increase the fishermen transparency to the regulation. 
This can be done as proposed by the Commission by the introduction of cam-
paigns that explain the reason why the fisheries regulation is a necessity in the 
EU and to secure transparency in accordance with the objectives in the Com-
mon Fishery Policy
63. Another way to increase the transparency of the fisher-
men is to increase the use of co-management. In the Treaty this is based on the 
subsidiarity principle, which means that the legislation shall be conducted at the 
lowest possible level, that is, the fishermen shall be involved in the manage-
ment of the fisheries which will increase compliance (see Raakjær Nielsen 
(1995), Sandberg (1995)). However, in general the question is whether the co-
managed system has any application in e.g. the North Sea cod or herring fisher-
ies, where a range of different States have their interests. The core problem of 
the common property resource
64 is that the users are not able to settle any sus-
tainable utilisation, which will probably also lead to compliance problems 
within the co-management system. Second, there is a need for further strictness 
                                                                 
63  Report on Monitoring Implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy: Commission document 
SEC (92) 394 final. 
64  The common property resource is defined as a resource that is property of a group of fishermen 
(see Berkes and Farvar, 1992).  
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with respect to the penalties of infringement of the regulations, and harmonisa-
tion of the penalties through the harmonisation of the fines at a higher level and 
so that offences are giving a equal punishment in all Member States. To this 
should be added that the fines in all States must be increased at a level where it 
is secured that the punishment stands in relation to the economic gain resulting 
from the offence. Moreover, more indirect kinds of financial restrictions could 
be implemented e.g. so that the latent grants to the Member State’s restructuring 
of the fishing sector could be denied, if the Member State has practised an in-
sufficient or laissez faire enforcement policy. The indirect financial instruments 
could also be used with respect to single vessel owners in the Member State, 
which has violated the regulations; in this case the master/owner of the vessel 
could be denied future structural grants from the EU. 
3.5.  Conclusion 
In general the outlining of the Common Fishery Policy is based on major con-
troversies between the Member States. This has had the result that it has been 
difficult to establish the comprehensive fisheries policy. Moreover, the different 
interests of the Member States have had the consequence that the fishery policy 
is based on a mixture of the social, the rationalisation and the conservation 
paradigms. This embodies the risk of inconsistency between the applied instru-
ments, and the implementation of policies, which have mutually conflicting ob-
jectives. This is seen, for example, in the simultaneous funding of modernisa-
tion and construction of vessels, and the funding of decommission schemes 
within the Member States. In this sense it is emphasised that although extensive 
regulation of fishery has been implemented, there are still some shortcomings 
that need to be dealt with in order to prevent the distortions emerging in the EU 
fishery. First  of all, it is important to recognise that there is inconsistency be-
tween the implemented conservation policy and the general intention to prohibit 
discrimination on ground of nationality in the legislation of the EU. This con-
troversy has to be settled once and for all, because there is the risk that the prin-
ciple of equal access will eventually undermine the consensus of the relative 
stability in the conservation policy. And a loosening of the conservation policy 
will inevitable increase the distortion of overfishing in the EU. In addition, the  
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quota hopping indicates that there is an ongoing rivalry over the access to the 
resources between the Member States. 
 
The structural policy is another example that indicates that the mis-management 
in the fishery has not been completely eliminated. That is, the structural policy 
maintains the subsidies for construction of fishing vessels, although the Com-
mission has suggested cancelling these subsidies. Moreover, it is difficult for 
the authorities to restrict the effective fishing effort, because only vague restric-
tions on the fishing effort have been imposed, and the regulations do not take 
account of the substitution possibility between the different elements of the 
fishing effort. The structural policy does not implement effective barriers to re-
strict the Member States from supplying subsidies to their fishing fleets. The 
latter could be used strategically by the Member States to maintain a high level 
of national fishing effort, and thereby politically undermine the  consensus of 
the relative stability. 
 
Finally, it is important to recognise that by placing the competence to control in 
the Member States. This means that the Member States are not prevented from 
applying a laissez faire control policy that practices a vague control of national 
vessels and thereby is used as a mean that gain the fishing vessel of the Member 
State in an internal rivalry over the resources in the EU. Therefore, the compe-
tence to control should be transferred from the Member State to the EU authori-
ties. This would suggest that significant financial support should be given to the 
authorities. This would achieve the result that the risk of detection and the ap-





Annex A. Cod Equivalents applied by the Commission 
Species  Factor  Comment 
Cod  1   
Haddock  1   
Saithe  0,77   
Whiting  1,86   
Ling, Blue Ling  1   
Plaice  1   
Sole  6,4  Relative value in NL 1978 
American Plaice  0,7  UK statistics 1977 
Witch  0,7  UK statistics 1977 
Mackerel  0,3   
Sprat  0,125   
Hake  3  EC reference price 1
st half of 1980 
Blue Whiting  0,125   
Sandeel  0,1   
Norway Pout  0,1   
Capelin  0,1   
Horse Mackerel  0,1   
Redfish  0,87   
Halibut  3,8  Relative price in D 1978 
Greenland Halibut  0,7   
Scrimp  3,0  Applied value during negotiations with Norway 
Herring  0,8   
Catfish  1,1   
Salmon  8  Irish statistics 
Tusk  0,7   
Anchovies  0,5  French statistics 
Cuttlefish, Squid  2  Catches from ICES IV, VII and VIII 
Squid  1,5  Catches from NAFO 3-4 
Flounder  1   
“Flatfish”  0,8   
Anglerfish  1   
Lobster  3   
Pollad  0,5   
Spurdog  0,5   
Dark Saithe  0,77   
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